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Introduction

Poverty is highly concentrated in rural areas. Four out of every five poor households
in Asia are rural (Asian Development Bank, 2007), and many of these households rely
on risky, weather-dependent agricultural activities. Rural livelihoods are therefore both
volatile across years, and fluctuate across seasons with the crop cycle. To address this
uncertainty, agrarian households smooth consumption and manage risk using two primary mechanisms: they share risk with other members of their community (Munshi and
Rosenzweig, 2016; Ferrara, 2003), and they migrate to diversify income sources (Banerjee
and Duflo, 2007). However, each of these mechanisms is imperfect. Informal risk sharing provides only partial insurance (Townsend, 1994; Ligon et al., 2002; Kinnan, 2020),
and migration may be costly or itself risky (Bazzi, 2017; Beam et al., 2016). The two approaches may also interact with one another. The presence of a safety net at home might
either facilitate or deter risky migration. New migration opportunities might either undermine informal insurance schemes by providing exit options or, conversely, produce
spillover benefits for other members of the network through transfers and sharing of the
extra migration income. Therefore to understand the overall welfare effects of encouraging migration, it is necessary to consider the effects of migration on risk sharing.
In this paper, we study the interaction between migration and social safety nets by
examining how new migration opportunities affect the nature and extent of informal risk
sharing within those villages. We have three main objectives. The first is to empirically
estimate the causal effect of migration subsidies on risk sharing. We take advantage of the
randomized controlled trial (RCT) described in Bryan et al. (2014) in which households
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in rural Bangladesh were randomly offered subsidies to migrate temporarily during the
agricultural lean season. While existing evaluations of the program consider only the
effects on direct beneficiaries (Bryan et al., 2014; Lagakos et al., 2018), we analyze the
spillover effects on the entire risk-sharing network. The second objective is to interpret
and explain our empirical findings using a model of endogenous risk sharing and endogenous migration, allowing for the complex set of interactions between the two. We
build upon the model in Morten (2019) and show that migration subsidies can interact
with the underlying risk environment to generate either positive or negative spillovers;
this is an important insight because it demonstrates that the welfare effects of policy are
heavily context dependent. We thus characterize key features of the environment and of
preferences that can alter how these policies interact. Our third objective is to estimate
this model using the experimental variation, use these estimates to quantify the welfare
effects of migration subsidies that we implemented, and consider counterfactual policies
of permanent migration subsidies and unconditional cash transfers.
The Bangladesh experiment provided very poor agrarian households money for the
round-trip bus fare (worth USD 8.50) conditional on one member migrating temporarily. Bryan et al. (2014) present the effects of the experiment on direct beneficiaries. The
subsidy offer led to a 22 percentage point increase in migration in the first year, household consumption increased by 30% for those induced to migrate, and migration rates
remained 11 percentage points higher during the next lean season, one year after the
one-time subsidy was removed. Our analysis goes beyond these direct benefits and considers the indirect spillover effects on households in the village that did not send migrants themselves. We document several types of experimental evidence that suggest
2

that risk sharing improved in treatment villages. For both migrants and non-migrants,
actual transfers between households increased, households in treatment villages became
more likely to report that they receive help from family and friends in the village, and
treatment reduced the effect of household income on household consumption by over
seven percentage points (a reduction of 40%). We also show that these results are not
driven by an increase in self-insurance (savings) nor by an increase in measurement error.
These changes in risk sharing imply that analyzing only the direct effects of the migration
subsidies gives an incomplete picture of the overall welfare effects.
Next, in order to understand why subsidies for migration led to an improvement in
risk sharing in this context, we develop a model in which both migration and risk sharing
are endogenous and jointly determined. The model allows us to study the underlying
economic mechanisms that link migration and risk sharing, which is important because
our results are in contrast to Morten (2019), who found that in rural India, an increase in
migration led to a crowding-out, rather than a crowding-in, of informal insurance. We
reconcile these conflicting empirical results by showing that it is possible to get either
crowd-in or crowd-out of risk sharing from the same theoretical model under different
local conditions and preferences and also different assumptions about the permanence
of the policy itself. Our model augments Morten (2019), which considers a model with
limited commitment constraints on risk sharing (Kocherlakota, 1996; Ligon et al., 2002;
Krueger and Perri, 2010) and an endogenous migration decision based on the net return
to migrating (Harris and Todaro, 1970). To that we add the possibility that migrants develop contacts in the city, allowing them to better obtain jobs. This “asset” can lead to
persistence in migration episodes. We model the migration subsidy in a flexible, agnostic
3

way: alongside the USD 8.50 financial subsidy, we allow the experiment to change the
utility value of migrating resulting from the encouragement offered by the experimental
design and from the fact that increased migration allowed people to migrate with their
friends. We estimate the value of this “utility subsidy” by matching the experimental
responses of migration and risk sharing.1
As mentioned above, the model can explain why a migration subsidy can induce either an improvement or a decline in risk sharing in different contexts. In many settings,
migration is a risky lottery: a household gives up some income in the village for a chance
at income in the destination (Harris and Todaro, 1970). A migration subsidy increases the
return to migrating, which may have two effects. On the one hand, increasing migration
may increase the total resources available to the village, thus increasing the social return to
the village of pooling income through risk sharing. On the other hand, the migration subsidy increases the private return to migrating, thus affecting the incentive to participating
in risk sharing. For example, if it is very risky to migrate, the private return to migrating
may be much lower than the social return because without insurance migration is simply
too risky to undertake. In contrast, if it is relatively safe to migrate, then the migrant may
not need the safety net provided by the network, and a migration subsidy may lead to
crowding-out of informal risk sharing. We show, by simulating the model for different
values of migration risk and subsidy levels, that we can indeed generate both positive
and negative spillovers of a migration subsidy on risk sharing.
While the RCT allows us to estimate the effect of the subsidies on risk sharing directly,
1A

later round of experiments in the same villages found that people are more likely to migrate when
others in the village are offered subsidies, even if they themselves were not subsidy recipients (Akram et
al., 2018).
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the issues discussed above demonstrate that a theoretical framework is essential to understand the underlying reasons behind our empirical result of improved risk sharing
and how it may change in other contexts. We thus use the results from the RCT to estimate a model that allows us to identify the underlying parameters. By combining our
model with experimental variation, we achieve cleaner identification by not having to
rely only on observational data, as Morten (2019) did. The model itself provides a powerful toolkit for analyzing alternative policies, and the resulting combination adds to a
nascent but growing literature that combines RCTs and structural models (see, for example, Attanasio et al. (2012); Todd and Wolpin (2006); Kaboski and Townsend (2011)). We
estimate parameters that characterize income processes, migration costs, migration asset
paths, and preferences to match experimental outcomes over three periods. Our model
can replicate the dynamics and treatment effects of migration and risk sharing.
Using these estimates, we quantify the overall welfare effect of the migration subsidies
and conduct counterfactual experiments to evaluate different policy levers. We estimate
that the experiment led to an increase in welfare equivalent to a 12.9% permanent increase
in consumption the year the experimental subsidies were disbursed, net of the subsidy
itself. While some of this gain is due to increased resources from migration, the welfare
gain is three times higher after accounting for the improvement in risk sharing compared
to the gain without accounting for the improvement in risk sharing. We also show that
alternative policies can have very different effects on risk sharing and welfare: an unconditional cash transfer leads to a slight improvement in risk sharing but a negligible effect
on welfare, while a permanent conditional subsidy leads to a worsening of risk sharing
but a positive welfare gain.
5

Our analysis has two important implications for understanding policy impacts and
the development process. First, it is crucial to account for spillover effects – which may
be negative or positive – to understand the full welfare effect of any policy that addresses
the income stream of households. This finding resonates with the growing literature
estimating spillover effects from financial inclusion initiatives, which can also have either positive or negative interactions with risk-sharing (see, e.g., Angelucci and de Giorgi
(2009) and Dupas et al. (2017)). Second, while in the current paper we focus on the causal
effect of subsidizing migration on risk sharing, the fact that migration and risk sharing
are jointly determined implies that any change to the ability of households to share risk
may also affect migration. The underlying ability – whether through the economic environment or other policies – for households to share risk may thus itself influence whether
households adopt new income-generating methods such as migration.
The paper continues by describing the data and experimental results on risk sharing
in Sections 2 and 3. We then move to the model of endogenous risk sharing and migration
in Section 4. We describe our estimation procedure in Section 5 and show, by simulating
the model locally around our estimates, the key comparative statics driving the mechanisms in the model. We then consider model counterfactuals in Section 6 and conclude
by discussing the broader implications of our findings for understanding the interaction
between informal insurance and technology adoption.

6

2

Data

The experiment randomly offered some households subsidies to temporarily emigrate
from villages in a poor region of northern Bangladesh. This region is prone to a period of
preharvest seasonal deprivation during September to December known as Monga, which
was the original motivation for the experimental intervention.2 Bryan et al. (2014) provides additional details on the experiment and reports on the program evaluation, focusing on the direct beneficiaries. In this section, we describe the experiment and the data
that is critical for understanding our analysis of the risk-sharing effects of this experiment.
The migration subsidy treatment was randomized at the village level. For all villages
in our sample, a census was conducted to ascertain eligibility for the experiment, where
eligibility was consistently defined as households who reported (a) having low levels of
landholding and (b) that a household member had to skip at least one meal during the
prior Monga season. In total, 56% of households satisfied both criteria. From the census,
19 households from each village were randomly selected from the group of eligible households to participate in the experiment and surveys, and these 19 households comprise our
analysis sample. In treatment villages, all 19 households were offered the subsidy; in control villages none were offered the subsidy.
The migration subsidy was an offer of 600 Taka (USD 8.50) conditional on one person
from the household migrating, with an additional 200 Taka given if the migrant reported
to our enumerators in the destination. This amount is sufficient to cover the cost of a
2 Income and consumption levels drop by roughly 50% and 25%, respectively during this period (Khand-

ker, 2012). Up to 60% of our sample respondents report missing meals during this period. This same phenomenon, colloquially known as the “hunger season,” is prevalent in many poor agrarian societies around
the world.
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return bus ticket and a few days food in the destination. The subsidy was offered in the
form of a grant in 37 villages or a zero-interest loan in 31 additional villages. We follow
Bryan et al. (2014) and combine these two into a 68-village “incentive” arm, and compare that against a 32-village “control arm” (composed of 16 villages where we provided
general information about migration opportunities and 16 others where we did nothing).
The subsidies were distributed in August–September 2008. We will make use of three
periods of data: (a) a pre-intervention survey conducted in July 2008, (b) effects during the
intervention year, collected in 2008–2009, and (c) longer-run post-intervention data collected in 2011, approximately two-and-a-half years after the experiment. We rely heavily
on 2011 data for our analysis of risk sharing because it is the only round to contain annual
data on income, consumption, and migration. We provide a summary of the timing of the
interventions and data collection in Appendix Table 2.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the sample of households in 2011 that we use for
estimation, which includes the 1900 households from the original experiment plus 627
new households from 33 randomly selected new villages in the same two districts using
the same eligibility criteria.3 Statistics are shown separately for all households (column 1),
households in control villages (column 2), and households in incentive villages (column
3). Our main measures of interest are income, consumption, and migration rates, but we
also show summary statistics of other measures of consumption smoothing. For income
and consumption, we exclude outliers by trimming the top and bottom percentiles as well
as households whose migration or treatment status is missing.4
3 In

2011, additional experiments were also run in the sample. Our primary analysis focuses on analyzing the longer-run effects of the original (2008) experiments. We discuss robustness tests addressing the
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Table 1: Summary statistics (post-intervention)
mean/sd
Total income
Home income
City income (among migrant households)
Total consumption
Any savings in last 12 months
Amount, among those who saved
Any transfers received from community
Amount, if any transfers received
Any transfers given to community
Amount, if any transfers given
Household size
% Migrant households
Number of households

All villages

Control villages

Treatment villages

9782
(4847)
8947
(4866)
2074
(1318)
19177
(5880)
0.47
(0.50)
368.96
(568.28)
0.57
(0.50)
5641
(11912)
0.18
(0.38)
2775
(6671)
4.05
(1.43)
0.41
(0.49)

9502
(4728)
8770
(4721)
1959
(1304)
18883
(6038)
0.43
(0.49)
363.45
(619.28)
0.57
(0.49)
4808
(7707)
0.15
(0.36)
2001
(3858)
4.04
(1.38)
0.39
(0.49)

10056
(4947)
9119
(4999)
2171
(1323)
19460
(5713)
0.51
(0.50)
373.49
(523.07)
0.56
(0.50)
6470
(14925)
0.20
(0.40)
3368
(8157)
4.06
(1.48)
0.44
(0.50)

1928

946

982

Note: Income, consumption, savings, and transfers are in Taka (approximately 75 Taka per USD in 2011).
Income and consumption are annual and per capita.
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2.1

Income

We use three measures of income in our analysis: home income, city income, and total
income. Home income comprises income earned by the household in the rural village and
consists of wage income, non-farm business income, agricultural income (crops and noncrops, valued at prices they would have obtained if they sold them), and miscellaneous
income such as lottery winnings and interest income. We do not include transfers from
other members of the community in income. City income is defined as earnings (both
monetary and in the form of housing and food) during migration episodes, net of travel
costs (such as train, bus, and rickshaw) to and from the migration destination. Total
income is the sum of home income and city income. Each of these measures span the
previous 12 months and are thus annual measures of income.5
Following Bryan et al. (2014), we convert these measures to per capita amounts by
dividing by the household size, defined as all individuals reported to be living in the
house for at least seven days at the time of the interview (which may or may not include
additional (2011) experiments in Section 3.
4 For the original balance tables of the baseline sample in 2008, see Bryan et al. (2014). Since the focus of
their paper was not risk sharing, we additionally plot the distributions of baseline income and consumption
in Appendix Figure 4 and show that neither the difference in means nor the difference in distributions are
statistically significant from zero between treatment and control households. Additionally, the baseline
”treatment” effect from a risk-sharing regression (as described in Section 3) using baseline income and
consumption results in a small and insignificant coefficient of 0.026 with standard error 0.028. Our main
sample trims the top and bottom 5% of the data; we show in Appendix Table 7 that our results are robust
to using more conservative trimming thresholds. Average income is 5% higher and average consumption
is 3% higher with a 1% trim.
5 Specifically, to capture daily wage employment respondents were asked about the daily wage in cash
in the past 12 months and the number of days worked, as well as in-kind payment with quantity and
price. Salaried workers were asked how many months worked, the monthly cash salary, and other in-kind
benefits converted to Taka. For non-agricultural enterprises, respondents were asked how many months it
operated in the past 12 months, profits, and share kept by the household. For agricultural crop and noncrop production, the total of each crop produced in the past 12 months was asked, and the amount sold and
money obtained minus cost. Migration income was ascertained over the last 4 months. Other income was
also asked about the past 12 months.
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migrants, depending on when they returned home).6 City income is around 20% of home
income, and households in treatment villages have slightly higher home income and city
income than households in control villages.

2.2

Consumption

Our measure of consumption closely follows Bryan et al. (2014) and consists of 215 food
items and 63 non-food items. Some of these items have a weekly recall and others have a
bi-weekly or monthly recall, so we convert these items to annual and per capita amounts
in order to be consistent with our measure of income. Like income, consumption for
households in treatment villages is higher than consumption for households in control
villages.7

2.3

Other summary statistics

Households in our sample typically contain four members, and around 40% of households sent a migrant over the course of the year. 47% of households saved some amount
during the year, but the amounts were very small (under 400 Taka). In contrast, many
households gave or received transfers from other households in the community: 57%
received transfers, averaging 5,600 Taka, and 18% gave transfers, averaging 2,800 Taka.8
6 In

the next section we show that our main estimated treatment effect of income on consumption is
robust to alternative household size definitions, including the current number of household members at
the time of the interview and the number of household members who are living in the house for at least 14
days at the time of the interview.
7 Total consumption is higher than total income, as is often found in rural household survey data collected in agrarian areas. The ratio of income to consumption, however, does not vary significantly between
treatment and control households.
8 The summary statistics in Table 1 show that average transfers received by members in the sample
are approximately six times larger than average transfers sent. The reason for this difference is that only
the poorest households in the village (based on land holdings and on experiencing hunger the previous
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Appendix Tables 3 and 4 give more information on the migration experience, based
on surveys of incentivized migrants in the destination and survey data from both incentivized and nonincentivized migrants at endline. Based on the endline data, 65% of
migrants migrated to a rural area. 54% of migrants worked in the agricultural sector,
24% worked as non-agricultural day laborers, 10% in the transportation sector, and 12%
in other sectors. 56% of migrants reported earning less than they expected. Survey data
from incentivized migrants in the destination shows that 98% of migrants found work,
with 89% reporting that the wage was higher than their home wage. Migrants predominantly traveled in groups, with only 22% migrating alone. 70% of migrants split food
costs and accommodation with their group members, and 73% of migrants exchanged
information about jobs with other members in their group.

3

Effect of the experiment on risk sharing

As Table 1 shows, households often engage in direct transfers between each other, presumably as a way to protect themselves against bad income realizations. In this section,
we empirically investigate whether offering migration subsidies affects the functioning
of risk-sharing networks. We take the risk-sharing network to be the village. By comparing treatment villages to control villages, we conduct direct tests of the effect of the
experiment on several measures of transfers and risk sharing.
year) were eligible for the experiment and thus included in the dataset; we verify in Appendix C that, as
expected, net transfers out increase with income. We note that any imbalance in the total amount of income
to be shared amongst eligible households does not affect the regressions within the observed data, as the
village fixed effect controls for the total resources in the network. However, one caveat to our structural
estimation is that we estimate the model using only data on eligible households.
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3.1

Effect on financial transfers

We start by showing that actual transfers, as well as the household’s self-reported willingness to ask for help, were affected by the migration subsidies. Table 2 regresses these measures on treatment to test whether the experiment changed these beliefs in the financial
arrangements between villagers (“Willingness to help”) and the transfers that occurred
(“Actual transfers”).
Each row in the first column is a separate regression of the effect of treatment on
each outcome between community members (i.e., family, friends, and other villagers).
The second column contains the mean of the variable among households in the control
group. The top panel suggests that the experiment significantly increased the willingness
of households to interact financially. For example, 57% of households in control villages
report that community members would ask them for help, and treatment increases that
by 11 percentage points. Not only are such intentions affected in villages where migration
subsidies were offered, but actual amounts of transfers also increased as a result of treatment. While there is no change detected in the probability of receiving a transfer, treatment increased the value of transfers received (among those who did receive) by 1,821
Taka off a base of 4,808 Taka, or 38%. The results for transfers given are even stronger: a
3.6 percentage point increase in the propensity to give, and a 1,310 Taka (65%) increase in
the amount given, conditional on giving. Since we collect data on a set of people within
the village who recently received external migration subsidies, it is perhaps sensible that
the results on “transfers given” are larger than those on “transfers received.”
Perhaps the act of migration leads to migrants bringing back gifts for friends in the
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Table 2: Treatment effect on transfers within the community

Willingness to help
Community member would help you
... and you would ask for help
Community member would ask you for help
... and you would help them
Actual transfers
Receive any transfer from community member
Amount, if any transfer received (Tk)
Give any transfer to community member
Amount, if any transfer given (Tk)

Treatment effect

Control mean

0.030
(0.020)
0.025
(0.020)
0.109∗∗∗
(0.033)
0.109∗∗∗
(0.032)

0.85

-0.024
(0.022)
1821∗∗∗
(678)
0.036∗∗
(0.018)
1310∗∗
(558)

0.83
0.57
0.53
0.57
4808
0.15
2001

Note: The sample includes households from the 2011 survey. Each cell is a separate regression of the effect
of treatment on whether the source denoted in the row would behave as described. Each regression also
controls for upazila (county). Standard errors, clustered by village, are in parentheses, and the mean of the
control group is in square brackets. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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village, which could be why we observe the increase in “transfers given,” but this does
not signal a broader improvement in risk sharing. In Appendix Table 5 we repeat the
analysis of transfers separately for households that sent a migrant in the past year and
those that did not.9 The results show similar effects for both the migrant and non-migrant
samples. Migration not only increased the willingness to share risk among particular
households that were induced by the experiment to send a migrant but strengthened
informal relationships within a village more broadly.
There are three takeaways from these results. First, there is a strong norm that households would provide and receive financial assistance among each other, as shown in the
summary statistics of Table 1. Second, the point estimates show that the migration experiment significantly increased the willingness of households to participate in these arrangements as well as actual transfers between households. Third, this increase is not limited to
households that were induced to migrate: non-migrant households in treatment villages
also reported an increase in the ability to use these informal arrangements.

3.2

Effect on the exposure of consumption to income

Since it is difficult for survey data to enumerate the full range of relevant gifts, transfers,
and loans, or to determine whether these transfers were made in response to an income
shock or otherwise, we now investigate the effect of the experiment on the extent to which
income relates to consumption. We test two key ideas. First, we explore the exposure of
consumption to income as a measure of informal insurance within the village. Second,
9 Although

this sample split is endogenous to the decision to migrate, we argue that it provides suggestive evidence of risk-sharing benefits spilling over to households in the village that did not receive the
direct migration incentives provided by the experiment.
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we investigate whether the experiment changed this exposure.
We first consider the exposure of consumption to income in control villages by regressing log of per capita household consumption on three alternative measures of log of per
capita household income using the following regression:

log Civ = γv + β log Yiv + iv

(1)

where log Civ and log Yiv are household i’s log per-capita consumption and income, respectively, in village v. Village fixed effects γv control for aggregate shocks to consumption.10 The main parameter of interest is β, which captures the exposure of consumption
to income, conditional on differences in aggregate resources across villages.
Table 3: Exposure of consumption to income among control villages
Log consumption
(1)
Log total income
Log village income

0.165∗∗∗
(0.021)

Log migration income
Sample
Observations
R2

Full
911
0.217

(2)

0.122∗∗∗
(0.018)

Full
946
0.194

(3)

0.117∗∗∗
(0.032)
Migrants
350
0.298

Note: The sample includes households in control villages in the 2011 survey. The dependent variable is
log of annual total per-capita consumption and the independent variable is log of annual per-capita total
income. Each model also includes village fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by village, are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
10 Below,

when we go on to consider the effect of the program on the exposure of consumption to income,
we also include household fixed effects to control for permanent income differences and the results we
obtain do not change significantly.
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Table 3 reports the results of Equation (1) using total income (column 1), home income (column 2), and city income among migrant households (column 3) in the sample
of control villages in the “post-intervention” period. In all cases, the income coefficient
is significantly different from zero, consistent with the absence of full insurance, and its
value below one is also consistent with the presence of a substantial degree of partial
insurance in the non-treatment state.
The next sets of regressions leverage the experimental variation in the data to test
whether a one-time exogenous decrease in migration costs via the experiment led to a
change in the coefficient on log income in the consumption regression in a subsequent
year. We augment Equation (1) to allow the transmission parameter β to vary by whether
the village is in the treatment sample:

log Civ = γv + β0 log Yiv + β1 (log Yiv ∗ Tv ) + iv

(2)

where Tv is an indicator variable taking a value of 1 if the village is a treatment village.11
The main parameter of interest in this regression is β1 , which captures the effect of the
migration treatment on the exposure of consumption to income.
Column (1) in Table 4 reports β0 and β1 using total per-capita income and consumption. We find a negative coefficient on the interaction between log income and the migration treatment, consistent with an improvement in risk sharing. Specifically, treatment
11 The

treatment indicator captures villages randomized to receive migration subsidies in 2008. As described in Footnote 3, additional experiments were implemented in 2011. We control for the additional
round of treatments through the village fixed effects and additional interaction terms between log income
and 2011 treatment arms. The 2011 treatments were implemented outside the Monga period (around April)
and did not have any effects on the coefficient on log income. We also run these specifications using only
households that did not receive any additional 2011 experiments (i.e., were ”pure” control villages) in Appendix Table 8. We find similar results.
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reduced the effect of household income on household consumption by over seven percentage points. Compared to an exposure of consumption to income shocks of 16%, the
migration treatment cuts this exposure by around 40%. These estimates are robust to the
definition of household size and household composition (see Appendix Table 9) and are
particularly large given that they are intent-to-treat estimates.12
Table 4: Effect of migration incentives on the exposure of consumption to income
Round 4
Log income (round 4)
Treatment effect on log income
Village-round FE
Household FE
Household head controls
Resource controls
Includes baseline
Includes 2013
Observations
R squared

Diff in Diff

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.157∗∗∗
(0.027)
-0.073∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.169∗∗∗
(0.028)
-0.066∗∗
(0.027)

0.130∗∗∗
(0.028)
-0.072∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.140∗∗∗
(0.029)
-0.061∗∗
(0.026)

0.112∗∗
(0.054)
-0.077
(0.061)

0.109∗∗
(0.046)
-0.099∗∗
(0.046)

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

1857
0.217

1857
0.267

2166
0.791

4371
0.721

X

1857
0.186

1857
0.221

Note: Table presents coefficients of the effect of log annual per capita income on log annual per capita consumption and the interaction with treatment (β0 and β1 from Equation 2). All models control for village
fixed effects and all other interactions between treatment and log income as well as log income interacted
with 2011 treatments. Column (2) additionally adds household head controls, column (3) adds household
resource controls, and column (4) adds both household head and resource controls. Columns (5) and (6)
show the result of difference-in-difference specifications, with the first coefficient shown being the interaction between log income and round 4, and the second coefficient shown being the interaction between
treatment, log income, and a post-experiment indicator. Column (5) includes baseline data, and column (6)
includes both baseline and 2013 data, and both include household fixed effects. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01

One concern with the interpretation of these estimates is that the cross-sectional coefficient on log income may be conflating a risk-sharing effect with a level difference in
permanent income. Thus, Columns (2)-(6) of Table 4 report a variety of robustness checks
12 We

report ITT rather than LATE (IV) estimates because treating one household may affect a neighbor’s
consumption through changes in demand for transfers – even absent sharing any extra migration income –
so the exclusion restriction for the IV would be violated.
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to control for such differences.

13

Columns (2)-(4) add observable characteristics to the

specification, including household head controls (e.g., education) in column (2), household resource controls (e.g., characteristics of the house) in column (3), and both household head and resource controls in column (4). The coefficients on both β0 and β1 are
very similar across specifications, with β1 ranging from -0.061 to -0.072.14 To allow for
permanent income differences, columns (5) and (6) control for household fixed effects in
an approach dating back to Townsend (1994) by leveraging baseline data (column 5) and
additionally 2013 data (column 6).15 Using a difference-in-difference specification,16 these
columns show similar results; we lose significance on the treatment effect when controlling for household fixed effects with just two observations per household, but it returns
with three observations. Overall, the differences across columns in both β0 and β1 are not
statistically distinguishable. In addition to these robustness checks, we note that these regressions should be interpreted in conjunction with the previous transfer evidence; both
provide evidence consistent with an improvement in risk sharing in treatment villages. In
sum, using different methods, all of our results taken together point to an improvement
in risk sharing in treatment villages as a result of the intervention.
13 Additionally,

we note that treatment was randomly allocated, so even if the cross-sectional coefficient
on log income is biased (because both income and consumption may depend on permanent unobserved
heterogeneity), the treatment effect does not necessarily suffer from bias. Appendix A.1 derives the conditions for the treatment effect to be unbiased in the presence of permanent unobserved heterogeneity. The
key condition is that the treatment effect on log income is additive. Our empirical result that the treatment
effect is stable with and without fixed effects is consistent with this theoretical result.
14 Results are also similar if we focus only on villages that were included in the baseline experimental
sample.
15 A caveat with the 2013 data—and the reason we do not use it elsewhere in the paper— is that there are
data quality concerns. Specifically, there was a significant amount of political strikes and strike-induced
violence in 2013, which made data collection difficult and likely changed migration behavior considerably
(see Akram et al. (2018) for more details).
16 The treatment effect on log income in columns 5 and 6 is the interaction between log income, the treatment indicator, and the post-experiment indicator.
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Another potential concern with the results in Table 4 is that our ability to measure income for treatment households may be less accurate than for control households, either
because migration income is inherently more difficult for the econometrician to capture,
or because migration income is easier to hide both from other households and from the
econometrician.17 If such measurement error were classical, either of these measurement
issues may create an attenuation bias in treatment effect estimates. To investigate this,
we repeat the analysis from Table 4 among households that did not send a migrant.18
We present results in Appendix Table 8. While this is an endogenously selected sample,
our ability to measure their income should not vary by treatment, and hence, this exercise should help to address the measurement concerns. The results show that treatment
also reduces the coefficient on log income for non-migrant households, suggesting that
measurement concerns are not driving the treatment effects we observe in Table 4. These
estimates are consistent with the experiment changing the risk-sharing equilibrium between all households in the network, not only the subset who were induced to migrate.
A final concern is that the coefficient β could mechanically decrease if the variance of
income increased as a result of the experiment. While the result mentioned above show17 Appendix

Table 6 report the effects of various sub-treatments that could help discern the presence of
hidden income (Townsend, 1982; Rogerson, 1985; Ligon, 1998; Kinnan, 2020). If migration makes it easier
to hide income because some of the income is earned away from other villagers’ watchful eyes, risk sharing can break down. To investigate the relevance of hidden income in our setting, we take advantage of
sub-treatment variations in the experiment, where some of those receiving migration subsidy offers were
additionally required to migrate in groups. Those group members were either assigned by the experimenters in one sub-treatment or self-formed by the migrants in another. Columns (2) and (3) show that the
treatment effect on the correlation between own-income and own-consumption continues to be negative,
even when migrants are required to travel in groups or to particular destinations. There is no statistically
significant change in the treatment effect when one of these requirements is imposed. This result suggests
that hidden income may not be a key constraint limiting risk sharing in this setting. Our model presented in
the next Section, therefore, focuses on limited commitment (as opposed to hidden income) as the primary
friction undermining risk sharing.
18 In addition, we run reverse regressions of log income on log consumption in Appendix Table 10, and the
ratios of the “forward” and reverse regression coefficients are very similar between treatment and control
samples.
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ing that the coefficient also decreased among non-migrants should alleviate this concern,
a more structural measure of risk sharing is the difference in the consumption equivalents
between autarky and participating in the network. We consider this alternative measure
later in the paper and show that it is consistent with our measure of the exposure of consumption to income.

3.3

Effects on savings

A change in the exposure of consumption to income does not necessarily imply a change
in risk sharing across households if the migration subsidy offers also increased the household’s ability to save. These households could be using savings (as opposed to migration
and sharing risk with other households) as an alternative consumption-smoothing mechanism (although this would not explain why we see an improvement in risk sharing even
among non-migrant households). In Table 5, we test the effect of the experiment on the
amount saved over the past 12 months. Columns (1) and (2) show that there is no significant effect of treatment on the amount saved, both among the full sample of households
(column 1) and the sample of those that reported saving a non-zero amount (column 2).
Not only are the treatment effects small and indistinguishable from zero, but mean
savings is also very small. For example, mean savings in the control group is 155 Taka,
which is 1.6% of their total annual income of 9,502 Taka.19 This is consistent with the
fact that these households are extremely poor, and the marginal propensity to consume
any extra migration income during this lean (hungry) season is very high. These null
19 Additionally,

Appendix Table 12 reports statistics of additional measures of savings against village
income for control villages and shows that mean liquid and cash savings are around 5% of mean household
income and 10% of the standard deviation of household income.
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Table 5: Treatment effect on savings per capita
Amount saved in last 12 months (Taka)
(1)
Unconditional

(2)
Conditional on any

Treatment

33.4
(21.0)

5.4
(37.4)

Mean amount saved, control group
Observations
R2

155.3
2359
0.01

363.5
1101
0.02

Note: The sample includes households from the 2011 survey. The dependent variable is the amount saved
(in Taka) per capita in the previous year, including zeros (column 1) and excluding zeros (column 2). Both
models control for upazila (county) and 2011 treatment arms. Standard errors, clustered by village, are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

savings results, coupled with substantial reductions in the coefficient on log income in
the consumption regressions and significant increases in financial transfers, all point to
the experiment causing a substantial improvement in the willingness and ability to share
risk in treatment villages. To understand why this happened, we next turn to a model of
endogenous migration and risk sharing.

4

Joint model of risk sharing and migration

We consider a joint model of risk sharing and migration based on Morten (2019). Households make migration decisions taking into account the returns to migrating, including
risk-sharing transfers. We assume that risk sharing is constrained by limited commitment
frictions (Kocherlakota, 1996; Ligon et al., 2002; Krueger and Perri, 2010). Other frictions
could affect informal risk sharing, such as moral hazard or hidden income, but several
pieces of indirect evidence suggest that they are likely not key constraints: the treatment
effect is the same across treated households that had to travel in unassigned versus as22

signed groups and to unassigned versus assigned destinations (Appendix Table 6), and
the treatment effect is similar across home income and migration income (Appendix Table
11), which we would not expect if migration income is easier to hide.20
We extend the limited commitment framework in Morten (2019) to allow for a migration asset, which we think of as a job connection in the destination. This asset can be
accumulated (or lost) over time, based on the experiences of the migrant in the destination. This extension will allow the model to approximate the fact that migrants tend to
return to the same employer – for example, Bryan et al. (2014) find that 60% of incentivized migrants return to work for the same employer – which in turn allows the model
to explain why the one-time experiment led to persistent effects on migration. In this
setting, therefore, migration serves two purposes. First, within a period, it potentially
increases the income available to the household. Second, because it allows individuals to
update their migration asset, it provides a dynamic payoff for the future.
We model risk sharing as between two households, denoted by i = {1, 2}, with identical preferences. We assume that households cannot save, which is consistent with the
empirical finding in Section 3 that savings are very low and did not respond to the experiment, and has the benefit of making the model more tractable.21 The timing of the model
is as follows. There are two sub-periods: a before-migration period, when the village in20 Additionally,

while other work has argued that permanent migrants may indeed have incentives to
hide their income from family members (Joseph et al., 2015; Baseler, 2018), 76% of the temporary migrants
in our setting migrate with someone else, 84% of temporary migrants worked with another person from the
same village, and of those that did, they worked with on average 6 other migrants from the same village.
Thus it may be harder to hide income in this setting.
21 The role of savings, especially hidden savings, may be important, however we note that in a limited
commitment environment, agents will not use private savings when public storage is optimal (Abraham
and Laczo, 2018). That is, the equilibrium of the limited commitment model excluding private savings (but
with public savings) is the same as the equilibrium of the model including it.
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come state is realized and migration decisions are made, and an after-migration period,
when migration outcomes are realized and transfers and consumption occur. We describe
what happens in each sub-period below. Figure 1 summarizes the model timing.
Figure 1: Model timeline
Model period
Start of period t —
Before migration —

After migration —

Start of period t + 1 —

Activities

State of the world

Start-of-period job contacts ( At )
Observe village state (st )
Migration decision ( jt )

ht = {st , At }

Exogenous creation of job contacts ( Ât )
Observe migration state (qt )
Make risk-sharing transfers
Consume
Return to village
Exogenous separation of job contacts (At+1 )

ĥt = {ht , jt , qt , Ât (ht , jt )}

Start-of-period job contacts ( At+1 )
Observe village state (st+1 )

ht+1 = { st+1 , At+1 }

At the start of period t both households are in the village. Each household receives a
village income, ei (st ), where st denotes the realization (from a set of finite possibilities) of
the state in the village. Each household i, based on its past migration, either has (ait = 1)
or does not have (ait = 0) an active job connection in the city at the start of the period.
We denote the before-migration job contact assets of both households by the vector At =

{ a1t , a2t }. The before-migration state is summarized by ht = {st , At }.
Next, each household decides whether to migrate based on the expected return to
migrating. Each household either sends a migrant (Iit = 1) or does not send a migrant (Iit = 0); we summarize the migration outcome of both households by the vector
jt = {I1t , I2t }. Migration income is uncertain and is not observed until after the migration
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decision is made.22 Migration involves a financial cost, dfin
t , which may be negative if migration is subsidized. In addition to financial concerns, migration also involves a utility
utility 23
.

cost dt

After migrating, migrants who migrated without a job contact match with

a provider with an exogenous probability π get contact ; those who migrated with a contact
already in hand keep it. Migrants then learn the state of the world in the destination,
qt , which is drawn from a finite set. We assume that the migration asset is specific to
the individual and cannot be shared.24 The after-migration job contact vector is given by
Ât (ht , jt ). Net migration income depends on the state of the world and the job contact,
less any net financial cost to migrate. Total household income depends therefore on the
realization of the state of the world in the village, the migration decision, the realization
of the state of the world in the destination, the realization of the migration asset, and the
net financial migration cost. Letting ĥt = {ht , jt , qt , Ât ( jt , At )}, after-migration income
25
for household i is given by ŷi (ĥt , dfin
t ).

At the end of the period all migrants return to the village. At that point, a household
22 The

assumption that migrants do not know their income before they migrate is consistent with survey
responses where 14% of migrants said they earned more than expected, 33% said they earned less than
expected, and 62% said they earned same as expected (we note that this doesn’t add up to 100% because
there are sometimes multiple episodes per household). Additionally, Bryan et al. (2014) show that migration
outcomes in 2008 predict remigration in 2009 only for the treatment (and not the control) group, consistent
with the treatment group not having information about their ability at migration.
23 We assume that all households face the same cost of migrating. An alternative way to write the problem
would be to allow households to have different costs of migrating, as considered in Lagakos et al. (2018).
In this case, the migration rule would additionally depend on the costs of migrating.
24 The migration literature has emphasized the role of social networks in providing information (Massey
et al., 2003; Munshi, 2003). Based on surveys with migrants in the destination, 72.3% of people report
either giving or receiving information about jobs from people in their current travel group. However,
when looking at actual remigration behavior, Bryan et al. (2014) find that previous migration was the only
factor that predicts repeat migration and that the number of friends and/or relatives who migrated is not
a significant predictor. One way to reconcile these two facts is to consider that information from migrants
affects the probability of getting a job contact once in the destination, but this information is not transferable
between migrants and nonmigrants. This therefore matches the modeling choice to make the migration
asset individual-specific.
25 This general formulation allows for the case in which migrant households also receive some income
from the village (for example, if other household members still work).
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is separated from their migration contact with a probability that depends on whether
they migrated in the period or not. With probability π lose contact, mig a migrant household
who had an active job contact loses it; with probability π lose contact, nonmig a nonmigrant
household who had an active job contact loses it. The job contact assets of each household
at the beginning of period t + 1 are given by the vector At+1 (ĥt ). The state of the world at
the beginning of period t + 1 is thus summarized by ht+1 = {st+1 , At+1 }. The mechanism
design problem then repeats itself in the following period.
To determine the risk-sharing capabilities between households, it is useful to first describe the optimization problem if each household is independent (i.e., not part of a risksharing arrangement). Households solve maximization problems at two points in time
ci (ĥ).
that result in the before-migration value, Ωi (h), and the after-migration value, Ω
The before-migration value is the expected utility at the time the household is deciding
whether or not to migrate:
"

Ωi (h) = max ∑ πĥ|h,Ii u( ŷi (ĥ, dfin )) − Ii (ĥ)dutility + β ∑ πh0 |ĥ Ωi (h0 )
Ii

#
(3)

h0

ĥ

The after-migration value is the expected utility once the migration decision has been
made and the household learns if it has a job contact, and then learns the state of the
world in the destination:

b i (ĥ) = u( ŷi (ĥ, dfin )) − Ii (ĥ)dutility + β ∑ π 0 Ωi (h0 )
Ω
h |ĥ

(4)

h0

Equations 3 and 4 are important objects for determining the value of migration subsidies
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in an environment without spillovers as well as for determining the credible threat points
in the full endogenous risk-sharing model.
We can now describe the full model, in which both risk sharing and migration are
endogenously determined. The optimization problem involves migration choices of both
households and the net transfer from household one to household two, τ, to maximize total welfare. This problem is constrained by two sets of incentive compatibility constraints
(one for each household at the before-migration stage, and one for each household at
the after-migration stage), as well as a promise-keeping constraint that household one
receives the utility promised to them. We follow the solution concept proposed in Ligon
et al. (2002) by solving for the conditional Pareto frontier that maximizes the utility of
household two given a promised level of utility to household one. Because households
make choices at two points in time during a period, we define two Pareto frontiers: first,
the frontier that maximizes the before-migration utility of household two, V (h), given a
state-dependent level of before-migration promised utility, U (h), to household one. Second, the after-migration frontier maximizes the after-migration utility of household two,
b (ĥ), conditional on the after-migration state ĥ.
V
We solve the model in two steps. Starting in the second sub-period, we solve for
optimal transfers τ (ĥ, dfin ) and continuation utility U (h0 ) for all future states h0 :

b (ĥ, U
b (ĥ)) =
V

max

{τ (ĥ,dfin ),{U (h0 )}∀h0 }



2

fin

fin



u ŷ (ĥ, d ) + τ (ĥ, d ) − I2 (ĥ)dutility + β ∑ πh0 |ĥ V (h0 , U (h0 ))
h0

(5)
subject to a promise-keeping constraint that household 1 receives their promised util27

ity:
b ):
(λ
ĥ

b (ĥ)
u( ŷ1 (ĥ, dfin ) − τ (ĥ, dfin )) − I1 (ĥ)dutility + β ∑ πh0 |ĥ U (h0 ) ≥ U

(6)

h0

and incentive compatibility constraints for the before-migration problem in the following
period for both households:

(βπh0 |ĥφ1ĥh0 ) : U (h0 ) ≥ Ω1 (h0 ) ∀h0

(7)

(βπh0 |ĥφ2ĥh0 ) : V (h0 , U (h0 )) ≥ Ω2 (h0 ) ∀h0

(8)

Then, given this optimized Pareto frontier, the planner solves for the optimal afterb (h) and the optimal migration outcome of
migration utility promised to household one, U
the two households j = {I1 , I2 }.
"

(
V (h, U (h)) = max

max

j

b (ĥ)}
{U
∀ĥ

#)

∑ πĥ|h, j Vb (ĥ, Ub (ĥ))

(9)

ĥ

subject to satisfying a promise-keeping constraint that expected utility for household
1 for migration outcome j is equal to their before-migration expected utility:

(λ j ) :

∑ πĥ| j Ub (ĥ) ≥ U (h)

∀j

(10)

ĥ

and incentive compatibility constraints for the after-migration problem in the second
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sub-period for both households:

b (ĥ) ≥ Ω
b 1 (ĥ) ∀ĥ
(πĥ|h, jαĥ1 ) : U

(11)

b (ĥ, U
b (ĥ)) ≥ Ω
b 2 (ĥ) ∀ĥ
(πĥ|h, jαĥ2 ) : V

(12)

The first order conditions (which are given in Appendix A.2.1) imply that the Pareto
weight follows a modified simple updating rule, as in Ligon et al. (2002) and Morten
(2019). The updating rule has two steps; a before-migration update and an after-migration
one. The history up to the end of period t − 1 is given by ĥt−1 = {ĥ0 , ĥ1 , ..., ĥt−1 }. Given
an initial before-migration Pareto weight λti (ht , ĥt−1 ), the after-migration Pareto weight is
given by:




bi ,

λ

ĥ




bi (ĥt , ĥt−1 ) =
λ
t
λti (ht , ĥt−1 )






i


b
λ
ĥ

bi
if λti (ht , ĥt−1 ) ≤ λ
ĥ
i

b
bi , λ
if λti (ht , ĥt−1 ) ∈ [λ
ĥ ĥ ]

(13)

i

b
if λti (ht , ĥt−1 ) ≥ λ
ĥ

And the before-migration Pareto weight the following period is given by:





λ ih0 ,





t
i
λt+1 (ht+1 , ĥ ) = λ
bi (ĥt , ht−1 ),
t








λ i
h0

bi (ĥt , ĥt−1 ) ≤ λ i 0
if λ
t
h
i

bi (ĥt , ĥt−1 ) ∈ [λ i 0 , λ 0 ]
if λ
h
t
h

(14)

i

bi (ĥt , ĥt−1 ) ≥ λ 0
if λ
h
t

While the model presented above applies to two households, we extend the theoretical
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model to N households26 in Appendix A.2.2, following Ligon et al. (2002). To implement
the N-household model we construct an aggregated ”rest of village” household, giving
that household income such that yrov = Ȳ − yi , where Ȳ is the total resources of the village (accounting for migration and migration income earned). We then solve the limited
commitment model assuming that there is household i and the rest of the village. There
is one additional step needed to implement the N-household approximation. When we
simulate the model we do not literally simulate only two households. We instead simulate N households who each follow the policy rule we derive for the two-household
case. We thus need to ensure the aggregate budget constraint is satisfied (the budget
constraint is automatically satisfied with only two households). We only use the bound
in the interval that corresponds to the incentive constraint for household i. We combine
this lower bound with an additional first order condition, that the rate of growth of relative marginal utility for unconstrained households is equal, from the N-person model.
We thus estimate one additional parameter which scales the marginal utility of unconstrained households in order to satisfy the economy-wide budget constraint.27 We solve
for the equilibrium policy functions, taking into account the before- and after- migration
incentive constraints for all households and the budget account for the economy (which
includes income earned from the endogenous migration decision), and solving the full
26 We

rule out coalitional deviations such as those studied by Genicot and Ray (2003) and Bold and Broer
(2016).
27 We estimate a scaling factor, ζ , such that the Pareto weight becomes λ̂ i = max (ζ λ̂ i , λ̂ ). We solve ζ
t
t t−1
t
t
to set total consumption equal to total income, i.e., ∑i cit (ĥt , λ̂ti (ζt )) = ∑i ŷit (ĥt ). In the initial steady state,
this requires solving for one ζ−1 to satisfy the budget constraint. Once we introduce the experiment into the
model we need to solve for a sequence of ζt such that λ̂ti = max(ζt λ̂ti −1 , λ̂ ) and the invariant distribution of
income is equal to the invariant distribution of consumption, for each t. We solve for one scaling parameter
in the pre-experiment steady state ζ−1 , one for the year of the experiment ζ0 , and one for each year t after the
experiment (ζ1 , ζ3 , ..., ζ T ), until the economy has converged back to the equilibrium steady state (measured
by ζ T = ζ−1 ). In practice, the economy converges back to the steady state 6 periods after the experiment.
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transition path of the economy after the implementation of the temporary subsidy (which
is introduced in the next subsection).28 Solving the model is computationally intensive;
we implement the estimation on a high-performance computer cluster. We discuss the
computational algorithm in Appendix A.3 and provide evidence that the computational
approximation works well.

4.1

Introducing the experiment into the model

We introduce the experiment into the model as an unanticipated shock. The experiment
29
changes the financial cost of migrating, dfin
t . We also allow the experiment to change the
utility

utility cost of migrating, dt

, for example, by either providing an endorsement effect or

by generating a utility benefit of migrating with friends. In estimation, we fix the financial
cost but are agnostic about whether the experiment led to an additional utility benefit and
thus estimate this parameter based on the observed treatment effects.
The experiment changes the value of autarky, given by equation 3 (for before-migration)
and equation 4 (for after-migration). The experiment thus affects the risk-sharing equilibrium through two channels. First, the experiment has a direct effect on the social planner’s problem (given by Equation 5 and Equation 9). Second, the experiment indirectly
changes the incentive compatibility constraints through its effect on the autarky value for
28 To

ensure that first order conditions hold, we smooth our objective function so that all migration states
occur with positive probability.
29 We are primarily exploiting the effects of the 2008 experiment which is the first time the villagers had
engaged with migration subsidies. If households instead believed that the subsidies would continue then
the risk-sharing effects may differ. Indeed, one of our counterfactuals in Section 6 asks exactly this question
and studies the case where subsidies were permanent, instead of temporary. We find in that case that the
risk-sharing effects would be negative instead of positive. An intermediate approach would be the one
studied by Ligon and Schechter (2019), who introduce a probability that the experiment is played each
period.
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households.

5

Estimation

The model described in Section 4 provides a framework to understand the mechanisms
underlying the impacts of the migration subsidy experiment as well as to evaluate other
potential counterfactual policies. To investigate how well the model captures economic
behavior, we structurally estimate the model using moments based on the experimental
variation. There are 13 model parameters, including: (a) the home income process (mean
and standard deviation), (b) the city income process for migrants with a job contact (mean
and standard deviation), (c) the migration contact process (probability of gaining or losing
a contact, conditional on migrating or not), (d) migration costs (utility cost, opportunity
cost, and utility subsidy),30 and (e) risk aversion and the discount factor. We estimate
the model by simulated method of moments (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989)
using an identity weight matrix. We next discuss the choice of moments and provide a
heuristic discussion of identification.

5.1

Identification

We use the experimental intervention to help identify the model. The experiment both
provides a genuine source of exogenous variation and allows us to account for the utility
aspects of the experiment that would otherwise not be identifiable.31 To estimate the pa30 We

net out financial costs of migration from income, and so only estimate the utility cost of migrating.
Attanasio et al. (2012) for a discussion of the advantages of using experimental variation to identify
structural models.
31 See
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rameters of our model, we construct moments from the data and match them to simulated
moments from the model. Here we provide a heuristic discussion of identification based
on how the chosen moments are informative about the parameters. We focus primarily
on data collected after the experiment was conducted, combined with data on migration
during the experiment to capture migration dynamics. It is important to note that each
moment is related to many parameters and we do not imply that there is a one-to-one
relationship between each parameter and a moment. Table 7 lists the full set of moments
matched in estimation.
The first set of parameters are those that determine the home income distribution and
the city income distribution for migrants with a contact. To focus on the role of uncertainty, we set the income distribution in the city for migrants without a contact to be
equivalent to receiving zero income. To identify these distributions, we match means and
standard deviations of the city income distribution for migrants, and means and standard deviations of home income for migrants and non-migrants separately. Note that
these moments are not moments of the true underlying distribution; they are a selected
and censored distribution due to endogenous migration decisions. Thus our simulated
moments explicitly account for this endogeneity by modeling the selection and censoring.
Specifically, we model censoring by assuming that migrants give up α% of their home income y, where α is the estimated opportunity cost of migrating. For migrants, this means
that mean observed income will be equal to (1 − α ) E( y|migrant), and for non-migrants
mean observed income will be equal to E( y|non-migrant), neither of which are necessarily equal to the mean of the underlying home income distribution E( y). Thus, the
observed home income distribution will differ from the true distribution because of the
33

combination of (a) selection into migration, which will typically be households with low
home income draws, and (b) censoring of home income of migrants due to the opportunity cost of migration. We therefore use the observed home income for both migrants and
nonmigrants to jointly estimate the mean and variance of home income. The opportunity
cost of migration is then identified as the residual – given the selection into migration –
that equalizes observed and true home income.32
Another set of parameters relate to the migration asset, which captures job contacts
formed as a result of past migration episodes and leads to state dependence in migration. The parameters that characterize this asset include three probabilities: obtaining a
contact (π get contact ), losing a previously formed contact if one migrates (π lose contact, mig ),
and losing a previously formed contact if one does not migrate (π lose contact, nomig ). To
identify these parameters, we construct moments that capture migration transitions conditional on earlier migration histories. More specifically, we construct eight moments
from the data to identify these parameters: the mean migration rate in control villages;
the treatment effect of the experiment on migration during the experiment and after the
experiment; the share of people who do not migrate either during or after the experiment
(both the control village mean and the treatment effect); and the share of people who
migrate both during and after the experiment (again, both the control village mean and
32 We

assume that households are not liquidity constrained. The limited commitment model assumes no
savings and so there is no liquidity on hand other than current income. One could specify that a household
needs to have enough current income to pay the migration cost, however, this would likely be inefficient:
the equilibrium of the risk-sharing model would be that the network “lends” money to people to migrate as
the network benefits the most if low-income households migrate. However, if households were constrained,
it may affect the estimation of key parameters: for example, if poorer households were liquidity constrained
and so did not migrate, actual migrants may be those with slightly higher incomes in the village than what
we simulated, and so we may be underestimating the opportunity cost of migrating. It could also be that
we overestimate the utility cost of migration by mistakenly attributing low migration rates to a high utility
cost of migration rather than a constraint.
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the treatment effect). The experimental variation plays an important role here because it
exogenously induces a number of people to migrate who did not have any previous migration history and thus helps identify the probability of obtaining a contact by observing
the re-migration rate following the first migration episode.
Migration rates also play a key role in identifying the opportunity cost (i.e., the share
of home income given up) of migrating (α y ) and the utility cost of migrating (dutility ).33
Moreover, the treatment effect on migration rates helps identify the utility subsidy in the
experiment (∆dutility ), conditional on changes in migration due to effect of treatment on
the migration asset. The decline in the treatment effect over time suggests that the utility
subsidy decays over time, so we estimate the fraction of the utility subsidy that is still
present in the period after the experiment.
The remaining parameters are risk aversion and the discount factor. We identify them
primarily using moments related to risk sharing, as these preference parameters help determine the level of risk sharing attainable in the economy.34 For example, the discount
factor–or patience–is relevant to risk sharing because part of the return to risk sharing
occurs in the future. We run the same consumption regressions on the simulated data
as we ran in Section 3. We treat the coefficients from this auxiliary regression as summary measures of risk sharing (risk sharing (control) and risk sharing (treatment effect),
respectively) and target these coefficients in the estimation.
33 We directly net out the observed financial costs of migration from our measure of city income.

Observed
financial costs are the answer to the following survey question: “During your travel from your village to the
migration destination, what was the total travel cost (include all costs related to travel such as bus/train,
ricksaw etc)?”
34 Of course, other parameters also determine risk sharing, such as migration rates and income distributions because migration is risky and therefore a high level of risk aversion would imply a lower rate of
migration for a given income gain.
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5.2

Estimation results

Table 6 reports our parameter estimates. We compute standard errors by numerical approximation (see Appendix A.5 for details). The parameters determining the contact rate
of migration are all in line with intuition. The estimates imply that, at the end of the period, 44% of migrants who hold an asset lose it and 66% of nomigrants who still had an
active asset lose it, although estimated imprecisely. For migrants who leave without an
asset, 79% would acquire one. We estimate that the opportunity cost of migrating is equal
to 15% of village income.35 This is in addition to the direct cost of migration, which we
observe. The size of the utility subsidy is estimated to be 0.08 utils (equivalent to 2.3%
of total utility of 3.23). Note that although the intervention only occurred in one period,
its impact on both migration and risk sharing is felt over future periods. We implement
this by estimating the decay rate of the utility subsidy of 0.15 to match the dynamics in
the data. Finally, we estimate a CRRA parameter of 1.9, showing moderate levels of risk
aversion and not dissimilar to what is found on consumption studies in other countries
(Blundell et al., 1994; Attanasio and Weber, 1995). In our main estimates, we set the discount factor to 0.7 and undertake robustness to this value in Appendix Table 14.
In Table 7 we show how these parameter estimates match the targeted moments. Focusing on the treatment effects on migration and risk sharing, the model matches the
decline in risk sharing as a result of the experiment reasonably well, predicting a decline
of 5.5 percentage points in the risk sharing β coefficient for the post-intervention period
35 We

estimate the opportunity cost to match the observed home income of migrants. The estimated
opportunity cost is lower than the average migration trip length of 75 days (approximately 20% of the
year), but these two do not necessarily need to align, especially if people migrate in periods of the year
when income is lower.
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Table 6: Parameter estimates

Preferences
CRRA parameter
Opportunity cost of migration
Utility cost of migrating
Utility subsidy
Decay rate of utility subsidy
Income processes
Mean home income
Std. home income
Mean city income with contact
Std. city income with contact
Dynamics
Prob. get contact
Prob. lose contact if migrate
Prob. lose contact if don’t migrate
Model criterion

1.88
(0.037)
0.15
(0.088)
0.075
(0.0051)
0.075
(0.025)
0.15
(0.83)
2.23
(0.23)
0.58
(0.0040)
0.38
(0.17)
0.78
(0.074)
0.79
(0.28)
0.44
(0.85)
0.66
(5.62)
1.715

Notes: The table shows parameter estimates and
standard errors. The parameter estimates arise from
estimating the model by simulated method of moments. The analytical standard errors are computed
by numerical differentiation. The mean level of utility in control villages is 3.23.
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(compared with a seven percentage point decline in the data). The model also captures
the treatment effect on migration during the RCT (35% in the model compared with 22%
in the data during the experiment, and 15% compared with 9% after the experiment). The
persistence of the migration effect is also captured well: we estimate an increase of 14%
in the share of people migrating both during and after the experiment, close to the 15%
rate in the data, and estimate a decrease of 16% in the share of people migrating neither
during nor after the experiment, compared with 17% in the data. Overall, the model is
capable of fitting the main patterns in the data, including the change in risk sharing and
the dynamics of migration, even with such a parsimonious specification.
Table 7: Model fit
Data

Model

Risk sharing (control)
0.16
Risk sharing (treatment effect)
-0.073
Mean migration rate
0.39
Mig. treatment effect (during RCT)
0.22
Mig. treatment effect (after RCT)
0.094
Migrate neither during/after RCT (control)
0.49
Migrate during and after RCT (control)
0.23
Migrate neither during/after RCT (treatment effect) -0.17
Migrate during and after RCT (treatment effect)
0.15
Mean log home income (migrant)
1.80
Std. log home income (migrant)
0.67
Mean log home income (nonmigrant)
2.13
Std. log home income (nonmigrant)
0.56
Log std. mig. income (migrant)
0.27
Log mean mig. income (nonmigrant prior pd.)
0.60
Log mean mig. income (migrant prior pd.)
0.73

0.16
-0.055
0.45
0.35
0.15
0.32
0.22
-0.16
0.14
1.57
0.29
2.63
0.33
0.23
0.39
0.51

Model criterion

1.72

Notes: The table shows the targeted moments in the data (column (1)) and in the
estimated model (column (2)).
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5.2.1

Robustness checks of estimates

We run several robustness checks of our estimates. In Appendix Table 13 we re-estimate
the model without a utility effect of the experiment. We find that the models without the
utility effect cannot match the risk-sharing level or treatment effect, a fact that is consistent
with our discussion of what is driving the experimental results in the following section. In
Appendix Table 14 we show the values of the function for different points of the discount
factor grid. The fit of the model is best for a discount factor of 0.7.

5.3

Comparative statics

In this section, we discuss the intuition about the key forces driving migration and risksharing outcomes – including the role of migration subsidies – and verify this intuition
through showing local comparative statics around the estimated values of the model parameters. We show that migration subsidies can either crowd in risk sharing or crowd out
risk sharing, depending on the underlying parameters and the nature of the subsidies.
The underlying intuition to understand the effect of a migration subsidy on income is
that risky migration is effectively a lottery (Harris and Todaro, 1970): by paying a migration cost, the migrant gets a new income draw from a support that may include both very
low incomes as well as very high ones. The option to migrate leads to a tradeoff for risk
sharing. On the one hand, migration introduces an additional source of income that – in
expectation – increases the total resources available to the network and thereby increases
the gains from sharing risk. On the other hand, migration may change the private ability
to smooth risk and thus change the incentive to share risk. The specific type of subsidy
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may also matter: a financial subsidy directly affects marginal utility (and hence the valuation of the income risk) whereas a utility subsidy does not change marginal utility (and
hence does not affect the valuation of income risk).
To illustrate the mechanisms in the model, we simulate the effects of providing financial and utility subsidies on migration and risk sharing. We consider an increase in
migration income variance around the estimated parameter values from Section 5.2.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots the baseline level of migration and risk sharing against the
income risk of migrating. Panel (ai) shows that the baseline level of migration is higher
(45%) under limited commitment than under autarky (0%). We do not find that the baseline migration rates vary greatly with income risk, reflecting both the migration cost (for
the autarkic case) as well as the relatively low (14%) opportunity cost (i.e., how much village income needs to be given up) of migrating. Panel (aii) shows the baseline risk sharing effect. As migration income becomes riskier, risk sharing improves. Panel (aiii) shows
welfare, measured in consumption-equivalent units, of each regime. Because households
value insurance, welfare in the limited commitment regime is about 4% higher than welfare under autarky; the gap between autarky and limited commitment welfare increases
as risk sharing improves.
Next, we consider the effects of a financial, utility, and combined subsidy to migrate.
Computational Result 1. A financial subsidy leads to a larger difference between the welfare
gain under autarky and the welfare gain under limited commitment when income is riskier
Panel (b) of Figure 2 plots the effect of a financial subsidy to migrate. Panel (bi) shows
that the financial subsidy induces more autarkic migration when migration is riskier. This
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is because a financial subsidy, by giving a guaranteed income, provides a form of insurance. Insurance is generally more valuable when income risk is higher. The effect on
migration under limited commitment is flat across the income risk: the network already
provides insurance against the risk of migrating and so the financial subsidy is not as
important in encouraging migration. Panel (bii) shows the estimated treatment effect on
risk sharing. For low levels of income risk, a financial subsidy leads to an improvement
in risk sharing (i.e., a reduction in the risk-sharing β). For high levels of income risk, risk
sharing worsens. Panel (biii) shows the relative welfare effect of the policy. In autarky,
the welfare gain of the subsidy is highest when income is riskier, reflecting the insurance
benefit. With limited commitment, the welfare gain of the subsidy is lowest when income
is riskier, reflecting the loss of insurance.36
Computational Result 2. A utility subsidy leads to a smaller difference between the welfare gain
under autarky and the welfare gain under limited commitment when income is riskier
Panel (c) of Figure 2 plots the effect of a utility subsidy to migrate. Panel (ci) shows
that the utility subsidy induces migration under autarky (from a baseline level of autarkic migration of zero). The migration effect under limited commitment also increases
as income is riskier, despite the higher baseline rate. Panel (cii) shows that shows that
there is a large overall improvement in risk sharing (i.e., a negative treatment effect on
the risk-sharing β) across the range. The estimated improvement in risk sharing is largest
when income is less risky. Panel (ciii) shows that welfare increase is larger under limited
commitment than under autarky, reflecting the gain due to the large improvement in risk
36 The

overall decrease in welfare is due to two factors: first, the social planner is optimizing a Paretoweighted sum of individual weights, but the figure plots the (unweighted) welfare gain to the average
individual; second, migration is costly and so the increased migration leads to an increase in costs.
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sharing. The gap between the welfare gain under autarky and the welfare gain under
limited commitment narrows as the gain in risk sharing falls.
Finally, Panel (d) of Figure 2 plots the effect of a combined (financial and utility) subsidy to migrate. The combined subsidy follows the general pattern of the utility subsidy.
This is because the model jointly matches both the income risk and risk-sharing effect
of the experiment. Given the level of income risk in the economy, the estimated utility
cost matches the improvement in risk sharing; the model estimates imply that the utility
subsidy must be large, and thus the utility subsidy is an important driver of the experimental finding. We return to this point when discussing the experimental effects in the
next section.
What explains these results? The main intuition to understand the differing slopes of
migration subsidies on risk sharing is to understand when the private value to the individual of migrating increases relatively more than the public value to the network as
a whole. For transparency, the comparative statics presented above considered a local
change in the estimated variance. Because income is log-normally distributed, this thus
conflates both an increase in the mean and an increase in the variance in income. We repeat the exercise in Appendix Figure 3 where we consider a mean-preserving increase in
the riskiness of migration income. In the case of a mean-preserving spread there is a clear
difference between a financial and a utility subsidy. If income is risky, then providing a
financial subsidy provides self-insurance to an individual, increasing the autarkic value
to the individual. A financial subsidy also increases the value of migrating under perfect risk sharing but because income risk is already perfectly pooled the financial subsidy
does not provide an additional insurance benefit. Thus, the private return to migrating
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Figure 2: Comparative statics around income risk: utility and financial subsidies
(a) Control group

(b) Treatment effect: financial subsidy

(c) Treatment effect: utility subsidy

(d) Treatment effect: combined subsidy

Note: Migration income risk is measured relative to the baseline estimate of the log-normal
standard deviation (i.e., a value of 1 is the baseline estimate).
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increases more than the social return, tightening the incentive compatibility constraint
and crowding out risk sharing. A utility subsidy has the opposite effect: because it does
not alter marginal utility it does not provide additional insurance. When income is not
risky, independent households are already willing to migrate, and so the utility subsidy
simply provides additional utility. When income is very risky, an independent household
is not willing to migrate and thus cannot benefit from the utility subsidy. At the same
time, the household values having insurance from the network as it allows them to migrate. A utility subsidy does not put additional pressure on the incentive compatibility
constraints and so risk sharing tends to improve. The simulated mean-preserving comparative statics match these predictions. We provide a further theoretical discussion of
the difference between a financial and a utility subsidy in Appendix A.4.2.

5.4

Simulating the experiment inside the model

We now simulate the experiment to study the dynamic effects of the subsidy as well
as to decompose the change in risk sharing into separate components attributable to the
financial subsidy and to the change in utility costs of migration induced by the experiment
(utility subsidy).
Figure 3 plots the time path of migration and risk sharing.37 Panel (a) shows the
combined effect from the two subsidies (financial and utility). The left figure shows the
migration response. Panels (b) and (c) show the effect of the financial and utility components of the experiment, respectively. In the post intervention period, we find that
37 Appendix

Figure 5 shows the same figure for alternative estimates where we do not include the migration asset or where we do not allow the model to affect utility.
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the financial component has approximately the same magnitude effect on encouraging
migration (15.1 percentage points) as the utility shock (16.2 percentage points), but the financial shock leads to a much more modest improvement in risk sharing compared with
the utility shock (0.6 percentage points compared with 5.5 percentage points).
To benchmark the magnitude of the estimated utility shock, note that the subsidy is
equivalent to removing the migration cost entirely for the one period (and then decaying
over time). Is this reasonable? While the utility cost effect of the experiment is unobservable, there is indirect evidence that the experiment did affect the cost of migrating.
For example, follow up experiments in the same villages (Akram et al., 2018) found that
the probability of migration for someone who themselves did not receive a subsidy was
9.6% higher if the person was in a village where approximately 70% of the residents were
offered a subsidy to migrate compared with a control village. This result suggests that migration costs fall when more people migrate, which would be one channel for the utility
cost effect we estimate.
Table 8 converts these results into welfare gains of the experiment in units of permanent consumption equivalents. The baseline experiment (“Temporary combined shock”)
led to an increase in welfare equivalent to a permanent 12.9% increase in consumption,
net of the financial subsidy itself, the year the experimental subsidies were disbursed. In
comparison, the estimated gain of the experiment without accounting for the risk-sharing
response would be a consumption-equivalent gain of 3.4%. In other words, welfare gains
are three times higher when accounting for spillover effects of the experiment through
risk sharing.38
38 These

results persisted in the subsequent period. In the post-experiment period, because of the persis-
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Figure 3: Effect of the experiment on migration and risk sharing
(a) Combined effect

(b) Financial component

(c) Utility component
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Table 8: Effect of the experiment on risk sharing and welfare
Endogenous risk sharing

Autarky

(1)

(2)
(3)
Cons-equiv
Cons-equiv
Risk sharing (Net of subsidy) (Net of subsidy)
Temporary combined shock
Permanent combined shock
Temporary CCT
Temporary UCT

-0.0876
0.0289
-0.0102
-0.0125

0.129
0.135
-0.0239
-0.00509

0.0335
0.0978
-0.00287
0.00638

Notes: Table shows the welfare effects estimated in the active intervention period. Note that
the risk-sharing moment targeted during estimation is risk sharing during the subsequent post
intervention period. The measure of risk sharing is the percentage point change in the risksharing β; a negative number reflects an improvement in risk sharing. The consumption equivalent gain is the percent point increase after subtracting off the direct amount of the transfers.

In sum, our model of endogenous migration and risk sharing can replicate key features of the economic environment and experimental setting in rural Bangladesh. Using
the model, we show that both the financial and utility components of the migration subsidies have important effects on migration, risk sharing, and welfare, and that ignoring
the welfare effects stemming from risk-sharing improvements leads to an underestimate
of the overall benefits of the subsidies. We next turn to alternative counterfactual policies as a way to further understand the economic forces that drive the codetermination of
migration and risk sharing.
tent improvement in risk sharing, the welfare gains of the experiment were equivalent to a 8.9% permanent
increase in consumption, compared to a 1.8% increase under autarky. These numbers are not presented in
Table 8.
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6

Counterfactuals

In this section, we use our model to conduct two alternative policy experiments: first,
the effect of a permanent subsidy rather than temporary subsidy; and second, an unconditional (rather than conditional) cash transfer. Both counterfactual policies have clear
links to actual development policies. First, development agencies often pilot programs
before deciding to roll them out and make them permanent. Understanding any differential effects between a short-term and a longer-term subsidy is thus important. Second, while many countries have enacted conditional cash transfer policies (for example,
Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico), a growing set of programs, notably GiveDirectly,
provide unconditional cash transfers because they argue that the administrative costs of
unconditional transfers are lower. We are thus interested in whether an unconditional
transfer would yield different welfare effects than the conditional one.
Figure 4 shows the migration and risk sharing effects of a temporary subsidy (i.e., our
main results) in Panel (a) and the effects of a permanent subsidy in Panel (b). We expect
that the permanent subsidy may differ from the temporary subsidy for two reasons: first,
the fact that the subsidy is permanent implies a permanent improvement in the outside
option which could make risk sharing less important, and second, the fact that migration
is persistent may imply that the average migrant improves their job contacts over time,
reducing the risk of migration. We find that the permanent subsidy leads to the opposite
effect – a crowding-out, rather than a crowding-in – than the temporary subsidy.39 In
our context, making the subsidy permanent would lead to a permanent 2.9 percentage
39 Appendix

components.

Figure 6 considers the decomposition of the permanent shock into the financial and utility
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point worsening in risk sharing. We estimate that a permanent subsidy would generate a
13.5% increase in welfare; this number is just 40% (viz., 300% for the temporary subsidy)
higher than the equivalent value under autarky, reflecting the negative effect on welfare
from the loss of insurance. This finding has an important implication for the validity of
extrapolating from RCTs to alternative longer-term policies: in this case the experimental
evidence, which is by nature short-lived, has the opposite implications for risk sharing
than the permanent policy.
Figure 4: Temporary vs permanent subsidy
(b) Permanent subsidy

(a) Temporary subsidy

Note: Shock is both financial and utility shock.

We next consider an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) rather than a conditional cash
transfer (CCT,) in Figure 5. The UCT does not change migration and leads to a small
improvement in risk sharing. Because everyone in the village receives the UCT, whereas
only those who migrate receive a CCT, the UCT is a much larger income transfer. As
such, the driving force in the risk-sharing effect is an income effect, compared with the
driving force for the CCT coming through the income risk of migrating. Table 8 shows
that, because the UCT does not cause any externalities through risk sharing, its welfare
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gain is essentially zero once the value of the subsidy is netted out.
Figure 5: One-time financial subsidy: conditional vs. unconditional
(a) Temporary conditional subsidy

(b) Temporary unconditional subsidy

Note: The left panel shows the effect of an 800 Taka financial subsidy conditional on migrating. The right panel shows the effect of an unconditional 800 Taka financial subsidy.
There is no utility subsidy in either case.

7

Conclusion

Our paper makes several contributions to our understanding of the trade-offs involved
with experimentally introducing new income opportunities into a village. The experiment we use is described in Bryan et al. (2014): households in rural Bangladesh were
randomly offered subsidies to migrate temporarily during the agricultural lean season.
We focus on the interaction between migration and social safety nets and examine how
new migration opportunities affect the nature and extent of informal risk sharing within
villages. It is not obvious the direction these effects will take, as they depend on the
nature of the intervention and the local context. Understanding the effects of facilitating migration also has broad relevance in many developing countries with high levels of
agricultural risk.
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Our first contribution, based directly on the experimental results, is to show that
the subsidy (i) increased transfers between households, (ii) increased the willingness of
households to help others, and (iii) reduced the exposure of household consumption on
household income, consistent with improved risk sharing. In order to understand this
result, as well as the broader policy implications, we build a model that reveals the conditions under which risk sharing improves. Our model draws on Morten (2019), which
includes limited commitment constraints on risk sharing (Kocherlakota, 1996; Ligon et al.,
2002) and an endogenous migration decision based on the net return of migrating (Harris
and Todaro, 1970), and adds a dynamic component making migration state-dependent.
We next show that the model can produce both improvements and declines in risk
sharing. The key forces are the riskiness of the migration option and the expected value
of city income. A risky migration option, which on average yields substantial returns,
encourages risk sharing in exchange for the benefit of this potentially large return. On the
other hand a relatively safe migration option, made easier by the intervention, discourages risk sharing because it also substantially improves the outside autarky option. Other
factors also play a role, such as the relative size of financial and utility migration costs;
our analysis points to many of these factors and how they interact.
We then fit our model to the experimental data to provide a framework to interpret the
experimental findings and to evaluate the welfare effects of the program. The model fits
the experimental treatment effects on migration and risk sharing reasonably well, providing a set of parameters that is consistent with improvements in the amount of insurance
available. We use the model to conduct alternative policy experiments in which the subsidy is decomposed and made permanent, and show that a permanent utility subsidy
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leads to a permanent improvement in risk sharing while a permanent financial subsidy
leads to a permanent decline in risk sharing. This result serves to illustrate how experimental evidence, which may involve only temporary interventions, may have very different impacts than longer-term policies.
These findings suggest a broader policy implication: the effectiveness of safety net
programs and conditional transfers very much depends on how community networks
operate and on the risk/return profile of the activities encouraged. In our experimental
setting, the subsidy led to a positive spillover on risk sharing, generating larger welfare
gains than in the absence of risk sharing. Nevertheless, we also show that in slightly
different contexts, the opposite may occur. As a result, it is important to take into account
these spillover effects when designing social protection programs.
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A

Theoretical appendix

A.1

Deriving the bias in cross-sectional risk sharing regressions

In this appendix we derive the bias of the treatment effect of the risk sharing coefficient
in a cross-sectional Townsend-style regression. We follow Chiappori et al. (2014) in deriving the risk-sharing test from first principles. We assume that household i has CRRA
preferences over consumption with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of σi , which may
be heterogeneous across households. In each period t, the social planner problem maximizes the sum of utilities of all households in the village, weighted by household pareto
weights λi , subject to a budget constraint that total income is equal to total consumption:
1−σ

c i
such that
max ∑ λi it
1 − σi
cit ,∀i i

∑ cit = ∑ yit
i

i

The first order conditions yield the following relationship for consumption, where λ̄t
is the Pareto multiplier on the village budget constraint:
log λi λ̄t
−
σi
σi
This forms the basis of the standard Townsend test for risk sharing:
log cit =

log λi λ̄t
− + α × log yit
σi
σi
= ui + xit + α × log yit

log cit =

where we use ui and xit as shorthands, and α = 0 under full risk sharing. We follow most
of the literature in assuming homogeneous risk preferences (i.e., σi = σ so xit = xt ).40 The
standard approach to estimating this equation is to add village-time fixed effects to control for xt and household fixed effects to control for unobserved household heterogeneity
ui .
Neglecting household fixed effects can introduce bias in α̂ if ui is correlated with individual income. We show, however, that the effect of a randomized treatment on this
risk-sharing coefficient is not necessarily biased under certain conditions. Denoting the
treatment T, the new equation (purged of village-time effects and suppressing the t subscript because we only use a cross-section) is:
log ci = ui + γT + α × log yi + β × T × log yi
and the corresponding estimating equation is:
c = αy + γT + βyT + δu + ε

(15)

where c is log consumption, y is log income, u is an individual heterogeneity term that
can capture an individual’s pareto weight, and T is treatment, which might be correlated
40 Interesting

exceptions are Chiappori et al. (2014) and Mazzocco and Saini (2012).
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with y but is otherwise uncorrelated with all other terms. We are interested in whether β
is biased when u is unobserved and cannot be controlled.
The standard OLS formula for the coefficients of Equation (15) gives:
−1
 
 
  
α̂
y 
y

1  
γ̂  =  1 Σ  T  y T yT 
Σ T (αy + γT + βyT + δu + ε)
N
N
yT
yT
β̂

(16)

The concern is the effect of δu on β̂ in this equation, so we concentrate on that term (if
zero, then the bias of β̂ is zero):
−1

 
y 
y

1  
 1 Σ  T  y T yT 
Σ T (δu)
N
N
yT
yT




(17)

The matrix that needs to be inverted is:
 


y 
var
(
y
)
cov
(
y,
T
)
cov
(
y,
yT
)

1  
y T yT =  cov( y, T )
var( T )
cov( T, yT )
Σ T
N
yT
cov( y, yT ) cov( T, yT ) var( yT )
Inverting this matrix, whose determinant is D, and plugging the inverted matrix into the
main equation gives:

δ 
D

...
...
cov( y, T ) cov( T, yT ) − var( T ) cov( y, yT )

...
...
...



...
cov( y, u)


...
0
2
cov( yT, u)
var( T ) var( y) − cov( y, T )

(18)

where we have omitted the first two rows because they do not matter for the bias of β and
the bottom middle column because it gets multiplied by cov( T, u), which is zero because
the treatment is randomized.
To solve the bias of β, we must specify y. We next go through several examples:
A.1.1

Bias when treatment and income are uncorrelated

We begin with y = u + η. Remembering that T is independent of all unobserved components (u,  and η) in this case, the various covariance terms are:
cov( y, T )
cov( T, yT )
cov( y, yT )
var( y)
cov( y, u)
cov( yT, u)

=0
= var( T ) E(u + η)
= E( T ) var(u + η)
= var(u + η)
= var(u)
= var(u) E( T )
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Plugging these in and letting δ ∗ =

δ
D

gives:

Bias =δ ∗ [− E( T ) var( T ) var(u + η) var(u) + var( T ) var(u + η) var(u) E( T )]
=δ ∗ [0]
=0
So Eβ̂ = β (it is unbiased) when y = u + η and u is omitted, implying an unbiased
estimate of the effect of treatment on the degree of risk sharing.
A.1.2

Bias when treatment affects income in an additive fashion

Now let the treatment affect income such that y = u + η + φT. The various covariance
terms become:
cov( y, T ) = φ var( T )
cov( T, yT ) = var( T )[φ + E(u + η)]
cov( y, yT ) = φ var( T )[φ + E(u + η)] + E( T ) var(u + η)
var( y) = var(u + η) + φ2 var( T )
cov( y, u) = var(u)
cov( yT, u) = var(u) E( T )
Plugging these in gives:


Bias =δ ∗ [var(u) φ var( T )2 [φ + E(u + η)] − φ var( T )2 [φ + E(u + η)] − var( T ) E( T ) var(u + η)


2
2
+ var(u) E( T ) var( T ) var(u + η) + φ var( T ) − φ var( T ) ]

=δ ∗ [− var(u) var( T ) E( T ) var(u + η) + var(u) E( T ) var( T ) var(u + η)]
=δ ∗ [0]
=0
So Eβ̂ = β (it is unbiased) when y = u + η + φT and u is omitted, implying an unbiased
estimate of the effect of treatment on the degree of risk sharing.
A.1.3

Bias when treatment affects income in a multiplicative fashion

Now suppose y = φTu + η. The various covariance terms become:
cov( y, T ) = φE(u) var( T )
cov( T, yT ) = [φE(u) + E(n)] var( T )
cov( y, yT ) = φ2 var(uT ) + E( T ) var(η) + φE(η) E(u) var( T )
var( y) = φ2 var(uT ) + var η
cov( y, u) = φ var(u) E( T )
cov( yT, u) = φE( T ) var(u)
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Plugging these in gives:
Bias =δ ∗ [φE( T ) var(u)(φ2 E(u)2 var( T )2 − φ2 var( T ) var(uT ) − var( T ) var(η) E( T )

+ φ2 var( T ) var(uT ) + var( T ) var(η) − φ2 E(u)2 var( T )2 )]
=δ ∗φ var(u) var(η) var( T ) E( T )(1 − E( T ))
=δ ∗φ var(u) var(η) var( T )2
So the treatment effect on risk sharing is biased in this case. Thus, when treatment affects income in a log-additive way, then there is no bias, but if the proportional effect of
treatment varies with the level of income then there is bias resulting from the omission of
controls for permanent income (fixed effects). The bias will in general depend on the extent of departure from proportionality. While admittedly a strong condition, in practice,
simulations show that small departures from proportionality only cause small biases.
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A.2

Model extensions

This subsection (i) derives the first order conditions for the two household model, and (ii)
extends the model to N households.
A.2.1

First order conditions for two-household model

After-migration problem
The after-migration problem is the following:
b (ĥ, U
b (ĥ)) =
V

max

{τ ,{U (h0 )}∀h0 }



u ŷ2 (ĥ, dfin ) + τ (ĥ, dfin ) − I2 (ĥ)dutility + β ∑ πh0 |ĥ V (h0 , U (h0 ))
h0

subject to a promise-keeping constraint for household 1:
b ):
(λ
ĥ

b (ĥ);
u( y1 (ĥ, dfin ) − τ (ĥ, dfin )) − Ii (ĥ)dutility + β ∑ πh0 |ĥ U (h0 ) ≥ U

(19)
(20)

h0

b βπ 0 ):
an incentive compatibility constraint for household 1 (multiplying the multiplier by λ
ĥ
h |ĥ
b βπ 0 φ10 ) :
(λ
ĥ
h |ĥ h ,ĥ

U ( h0 ) ≥ Ω1 ( h0 ) ∀ h0 ;

(21)

and an incentive compatibility constraint for household 2 (multiplying the multiplier by
βπh0 |ĥ ):

(βπh0 |ĥφ2h0 ,ĥ ) :

V (h0 , U (h0 )) ≥ Ω2 (h0 ) ∀h0

(22)

The first order conditions yield:
u1 (c2 (ĥ))
b
=λ
ĥ
u1 (c1 (ĥ))
0

0

b
V2 (h , U (h )) = λ
ĥ

(23)

(1 + φ1h0 ,ĥ )

(1 + φ2h0 ,ĥ )

(24)

and the envelope condition yields:
(25)

b2 (ĥ, U
b (ĥ)) = λ
b
V
ĥ
Before-migration problem
The before-migration problem is:
V (h, U (h)) = max{ max
j

∑ πĥ|h, j Vb (ĥ, Ub (ĥ))}

b (ĥ)}
{U
∀ĥ ĥ

(26)

subject to a promise-keeping constraint that needs to hold for each migration outcome j:

(λ j ) :

∑ πĥ|h, j Ub (ĥ) ≥ U (h)
ĥ
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∀ j;

(27)

an incentive compatibility constraint for household 1 (multiplying the multiplier by λ j πĥ|h, j ):

(λ j πĥ|h, jαĥ1 ) :

b (ĥ) ≥ Ω
b 1 (ĥ) ∀ĥ;
U

(28)

and an incentive compatibility constraint for household 2 (multiplying the multiplier by
πĥ|h, j ):
b (ĥ, U (ĥ)) ≥ Ω
b 2 (ĥ) ∀ĥ
(29)
(π α 2 ) : V
ĥ|h, j ĥ

The first order condition yields:
b2 (ĥ, U (ĥ)) = −λ j
V

(1 + αĥ1 )

(1 + αĥ2 )

(30)

∀ĥ

and the envelope condition yields:
(31)

V2 (h, U (h)) = −λ j ∀ j

Updating rules
This section derives the updating rule for the Pareto weight. Consider an initial beforemigration Pareto weight of λt .
Equations 30, 25, and 23 imply that:
λ̂t =

u1 (c2t (ĥt ))

u1 (c1t (ĥt ))

= −λt

(1 + αĥ1 )
t

(32)

(1 + αĥ2 )
t

Then, equation 24 implies that:
λt+1 = V2 (ht+1 , U (ht+1 )) = λ̂t

(1 + φ1h
(1 + φ2h

t+1 , ĥt
t+1

)

)
,ĥ

(33)

t

And so equations 30, 25, and 23 imply that:
λ̂t+1 =

u1 (c2t+1 (ĥt+1 ))

u1 (c1t+1 (ĥt+1 ))

= − λ t+1

(1 + αĥ1

)

(1 + αĥ2

)

t+1

t+1

(34)

Notice that this implies that the change in the ratio of marginal utilities is given by

(1 + φ1h ,ĥ )(1 + αh1t+1 )
u1 (c2 (ĥt+1 ))/u1 (c1 (ĥt+1 ))
λ̂t+1
t+1 t
=
=
2
2
1
(
1
+
φ
)(1 + αh2t+1 )
λ̂
u1 (c (ĥt ))/u1 (c (ĥt ))
t
h ,ĥ
t+1

If neither household is constrained (αh1t+1 = αh2t+1 = φ1h

(35)

t

= φ2h ,ĥ =0) then the rate
t+1 t
of growth of relative marginal utility is zero. Otherwise, the change in marginal utility
adjusts towards whichever household has the binding participation constraints.
Consumption is derived from the after-migration first order conditions as follows:
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t+1 , ĥt

u1 (c1 )
=λ
u1 (c2 )
c1 + c2 = Y

(36)
(37)

and implies that consumption is given by:
c1 =
c2 =
A.2.2

λ

−1
γ

1+λ
1
1+λ

−1
γ

−1
γ

Y

(38)

Y

(39)

Extension to N household case

The model presented in the paper consists of two households. Here we extend the model
to N households. Now, the Pareto frontier traces out the utility to household N, given
promised utility to households 1, ..., N − 1.
The after-migration problem is:
b (ĥ, U
b 1 (ĥ), U
b 2 (ĥ), ..., U
b N −1 (ĥ)) = n
V

max
ou
0
{τi ,{Ui (h )}∀h0 }∀i=1,...,N −1

ŷ N (ĥ, dfin ) +

N −1

∑

i =1

τi (ĥ, dfin )

!

− I N (ĥ)dutility + β ∑ πh0 |ĥ V (h0 , U1 (h0 ), U2 (h0 ), ..., UN −1 (h0 )) (40)
h0

subject to promise-keeping constraints for each household i = 1, ..., N − 1:
bi ) :
(λ
ĥ

bi (ĥ), ∀i = 1, ..., N − 1;
u( yi (ĥ, dfin ) − τi (ĥ, dfin )) − Ii (ĥ)dutility + β ∑ πh0 |ĥ Ui (h0 ) ≥ U
h0

(41)
incentive compatibility constraints for each household i = 1, ..., N − 1 (multiplying the
bi βπ 0 ):
multiplier by λ
h |ĥ
ĥ

bi βπ 0 φi 0 ) :
(λ
h |ĥ h ,ĥ
ĥ

Ui (h0 ) ≥ Ωi (h0 ) ∀h0 , ∀i = 1, ..., N − 1;

(42)

and an incentive compatibility constraint for household N (multiplying the multiplier by
βπh0 |ĥ ):

(βπh0 |ĥφhN0 ,ĥ ) :

V (h0 , U (h0 )) ≥ Ω N (h0 ) ∀h0

(43)

The before-migration problem is:
V (h, U1 (h), U2 (h), ..., UN −1 (h)) = max{
j

max

∑ πĥ|h, j Vb (ĥ, Ub1 (ĥ), Ub2 (ĥ), ...Ub N−1 (ĥ))}

bi (ĥ)}
{U
∀ĥ,∀i=1,...,N −1 ĥ
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(44)

subject to a promise-keeping constraint for each household i = 1, ..., N − 1:

(λ ij ) :

∑ πĥ|h, j Ub (ĥ) ≥ U (h)∀ j, ∀i = 1, ..., N − 1;

(45)

ĥ

incentive compatibility constraints for each household i = 1, ..., N − 1 (multiplying the
multiplier by λ ij πĥ|h, j ):

(λ ij πĥ|h, jαĥi ) :

bi (ĥ) ≥ Ω
b i (ĥ) ∀ĥ, ∀i = 1, ..., N − 1;
U

(46)

and an incentive compatibility constraint for household N (multiplying the multiplier by
πĥ|h, j ):
b (ĥ, U1 (ĥ), U2 (ĥ), ..., UN −1 (ĥ)) ≥ Ω
b N (ĥ) ∀ĥ
(π α N ) : V
(47)
ĥ|h, j ĥ

Similar to the two household model, the rate of growth of marginal utility for any two
households i and g is given by:

(1 + φih ,ĥ )(1 + αhi t+1 )
λ̂t+1
u1 (c g (ĥt+1 ))/u1 (ci (ĥt+1 ))
t+1 t
=
=
g
g
g
i
λ̂t
(1 + φh ,ĥ )(1 + αht+1 )
u1 (c (ĥt ))/u1 (c (ĥt ))
t+1

If neither household is constrained

g
αh
t+1

(αhi t+1

φi
ht+1 ,ĥt

(48)

t

g

=
=
= φh ,ĥ =0) then the rate
t+1 t
of growth of relative marginal utility is constant (but unknown) for the two households.
This equation therefore gives one more equation that, together with the budget constraint
that total income equals total consumption, allows us to estimate the level of utility. To
do this we estimate scaling factors, ζt , where t indexes the time period relative to the
one-off experiment, such that total consumption is equal to total income. That is, we find
ζt such that λ̂ti = max(ζt λ̂ti −1 , λ̂ ) and the invariant distribution of income is equal to the
invariant distribution of consumption (i.e., ∑i cit (ĥt , λ̂ti (ζt )) = ∑i ŷit (ĥt )). We solve for one
scaling parameter in the pre-experiment steady state ζ−1 , one for the year of the experiment ζ0 , and one for each year t after the experiment (ζ1 , ζ3 , ..., ζ T ), until the economy has
converged back to the equilibrium steady state (measured by ζ T = ζ−1 ).
Consumption is derived from the after-migration first order conditions as follows. If
preferences are Gorman-aggregable, then the following system of equations:
u 1 ( ci )
= λ i , ∀i = 1, ..., N − 1
u1 (c N )

∑ ci = Y

(49)
(50)

imply that consumption is given by:

−1

(λ i ) γ


−1 Y,
c i = 1 + ∑i 6= N ( λ i ) γ
1


−1 Y,

i γ
1 + ∑i 6= N ( λ )

if i 6= N
if i = N

(51)

Thus, the aggregate “rest of village” household is given by
c

rov

=

∑

i6= N

=

∑i 6= N ( λ i )
1 + ∑i 6= N
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−1
γ

(λ i )

−1
γ

Y

(52)

A.3

Computational algorithm

We solve the problem using a similar algorithm to that in Morten (2019). We solve the
algorithm assuming that there are two households: an individual household and the “rest
of the village” household. We solve by value function iteration for two grids: the beforemigration grid and the after-migration grid. Relative to Morten (2019), we additionally
consider both a migration asset as well as a temporary experiment shock. This introduces
two additional state variables–the asset and the time relative to the experiment–into the
algorithm.
The before-migration grid has the following state variables: {λ, s, A, t} where λ is the
before-migration Pareto weight; s is the state of the world in the village; A is beforemigration assets, and t measures time relative to the temporary shock: t = −1, 0, 1, ..., T
where T is large enough so that the economy has returned to the steady-state equilibrium
(in practice, this occurs by T = 7).
The after-migration grid has the following state variables: {λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t} where λ̂ is
the after-migration Pareto weight, s is the state of the world in the village, q is the state
of world in the destination, j indexes the migration decision, Â is after-migration assets,
and t measures time relative to the temporary shock.
The algorithm loops through five steps to solve the problem. First, holding the scaling factor and the distribution of agents across the state space constant, it solves for the
optimal order for agents to migrate under perfect risk sharing. Second, iterating through
each possible migration outcome (in the given order of migration), it solves for the optimal lower and upper bounds of the before-migration and after-migration Pareto weights.
Third, it chooses the migration decision that maximizes total welfare. Fourth, it updates
the distribution of agents across the state space, accounting for the updated migration
rule and interval bounds, and iterates until it finds a fixed point for total income (which
is affected by migration) in the economy. Fifth, it solves for a fixed point of the scaling
factors such that the economy-wide budget constraint is satisfied and then iterates until a
fixed point of the scaling factors is found.
The algorithm requires the following steps. Let i index the before-migration grid point
{λi , si , Ai , ti } and î index the after-migration grid point {λ̂î , sî , qî , jî , Âî , tî }.
1. Choose an initial before-migration distribution of agents across the state space Π0 =
1
.
{λ, s, A, t}. We set Π0 = {Π01 , Π02 , ..., Π0T }, with Π0t = number elements
(λ,s,A)
2. Solve the algorithm under perfect risk sharing to find the before-migration value
function under perfect risk sharing and the order of migration (see Appendix A.4.1).
(a) Compute the return to agent i migrating: income gaini = ei (s) − Emi (q, A)
(b) Guess an initial sort order for agents to migrate: D0 = f (income gaini , Ai , λi )
(c) Consider each migration possibility from j = 0 (i.e., no agent migrates) to
j = N (i.e., all agents migrate), imposing the sort order D0
i. Compute the total resources in the economy under migration rule j based
on village income and the expected income gain
ii. Assign consumption based on the Pareto weight λi
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iii. Compute total welfare W j = ∑i λi (u(ci ) − I j dutility cost )
(d) Compute the change in total welfare as one additional person migrates: ∆W j =
W j+1 − W j
(e) Order agents in terms of decreasing marginal change in welfare from migrating: D1 = f (∆W j )
(f) Compare sort order D0 and D1 . Iterate Steps 2c to 2e until the sort order has
converged.
3. Choose an initial scaling vector Z. We set Z0 = {ζ0 , ζ1 , ..., ζ T } = 1.
4. Solve the limited commitment algorithm
(a) Choose an initial before-migration value function V0 . A good choice is
V0 = max(W perfect (λ, s, A, t), Ω(λ, s, A, t)).
(b) For each migration outcome j = 1,..., T+1 given by the sort order D perfect :
i. Compute the total resources in the economy under migration rule j based
on village income and the expected income gain. Assign income to the
rest-of-village (ROV) household such that yij + y ROV,i
= Yj.
j
ii. Compute the after-migration value functions V̂0,i j = f (λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t) and

V̂0,ROV,i
= f (λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t), assigning consumption based on the after-migration
j

Pareto weight λ̂i , and the future continuation value V0,i j (λ, s, A, t) and V0,ROV,i
(λ, s, A, t).
j
iii. Impose after-migration incentive constraints
A. Find λ̂ s.t. V̂0,i j (λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t) = Ω̂i (s, q, j, Â, t)
B. Find λ̂ s.t. V̂0,ROV,i
(λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t) = Ω̂ ROV (s, q, j, Â, t)
j
C. Impose the IC constraints by updating the Pareto weight: λ̂1 = min(max(ζt λ̂, λ̂ ), λ̂ )

(λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t) =
D. Update V̂1,i j (λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t) = V̂0,i j (λ̂1 , s, q, j, Â, t) and V̂1,ROV,i
j
V̂0,ROV,i
(λ̂1 , s, q, j, Â, t)
j

iv. Compute the before-migration expected value, applying the migration rule
j: V0,i j = f (λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t); V0,ROV,i
= f (λ̂, s, q, j, Â, t)
j
v. Impose the before-migration incentive constraints
A. Find λ s.t. V0,i j (λ, s, q, j, Â, t) = Ωi (s, q, j, Â, t)
B. Find λ s.t. V0,ROV,i
(λ, s, q, j, Â, t) = Ω ROV,i (s, q, j, Â, t)
j
C. Find the updated Pareto weight that satisfies both constraints: λ1 =
min(max(λ, λ ), λ )
D. Update the value functions: V1,i j (λ, s, A, t) = V0,i j (λ1 , s, A, t) and V1,ROV
j ( λ, s, A, t ) =
V0,ROV,i
(λ1 , s, A, t)
j

(c) Iterate Steps 4(b)i to 4(b)vD until the before-migration value function has converged i.e., |V1i j − V0i j | <  for some small .
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)
(d) Compute total welfare for migration decision j by W j = ∑i (λi V1i j + V1ROV
j
(e) Choose j that maximizes total welfare and save total resources Y1 = Y j
5. Compute the new distribution of agents across the state space, imposing the migration policy function and the before-migration and after-migration intervals
6. Repeat Steps 4(b)i to 4e until total resources Y1 has converged. This implies that the
migration decision has reached a fixed point.
7. Find the values of the scaling factors that solve the budget constraint: solve Z1 =
∗ , ζ ∗ , ..., ζ ∗ } such that excess demand is equal to zero for each t.
{ζ−
1 0
T
8. Update Z0 and iterate Steps 4-7 until | Z1 − Z0 | <  for some small .
A.3.1

Checking N household approximation

Our ”rest of village” approach is based on the approach in Ligon et al. (2002). As described by the algorithm, we then solve the limited commitment model assuming that
there is household i and the rest of the village. This means that we are assuming that
the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint is equal to the sum of the N − 1
individual constraints. This is a large assumption, and so it is natural to ask how close the
computational approximation is. Fortunately, the approximation appears to work well.
For a version of the model without aggregate shocks and without endogenous migration,
it is possible to solve the model for a continuum of agents, following Krueger and Perri
(2010). The tables below (replicated from the appendix in Morten (2019)) compare the
model solution to the continuum case with the ”rest of village” approximation. The number of households in the table refers to how many average households the rest of village is
assumed to incorporate (this essentially sets the ”size” of the rest of the village relative to
one household). As the table shows, the approximation between solving the model with
the continuum and the discrete method is fairly close on several measures of income and
consumption.
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Appendix Figure 1: Table from Morten (2019)
Appendix Table 27: Comparison of discrete approximation to continuum
Continuum
(1)
Mean income
Mean consumption
Min consumption
Max consumption
Standard deviation consumption
Correlation income, consumption
Risk sharing beta

1.500
1.500
1.073
1.765
0.160
0.808
0.324

Discrete
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
4 HH 10 HH 30 HH 50 HH
1.500
1.500
1.099
1.807
0.315
0.976
0.767

1.500
1.500
1.099
1.790
0.301
0.964
0.726

1.500
1.500
1.099
1.694
0.222
0.876
0.486

1.500
1.500
1.099
1.631
0.163
0.806
0.328

Notes: Table compares the limited commitment solution calculated two different methods.

G

Computational appendix

This computational appendix discusses the accuracy of the discrete approximation and provides details on the algorithms used to solve the model.
G.1

Accuracy of the discrete approximation

It is possible to check the accuracy of the approximation method against
an alternative method of assuming that there are a continuum of agents
and solving the limited commitment model and comparing the simulated
distributions of consumption. The following section does this. I do this
for the case of the standard limited commitment model. It is necessary to
shut down aggregate shocks to solve the continuum model because of the
standard problem that the total resources will be an infinitely-dimensioned
object. I use the algorithm for the continuum case outlined in Krueger and
68 solution methods, solved for both
Perri (2010). Table 27 compares the two
the continuum and the discrete case. The number of households represents
how many households are averaged to construct the “rest of the village”

A.4

Properties of migration decision

This section examines the migration decision. First, we derive the migration rule under perfect risk sharing to show how the policy rule depends on both the Pareto weight
and the gain from migrating. Next, we show the how the properties of the transfer (i.e.,
whether it is financial or utility) interact with the value of the subsidy and the autarky
migration decision.
A.4.1

Optimal migration under perfect risk sharing

This section derives the migration rule under perfect risk sharing.
If household i is in the village, they earn ei . If they migrate, they earn Emi and need
to pay the utility cost d. The social planner chooses migration (I) and consumption c for
each household by maximizing:
max

∑ λ i [ u ( c i ) − Ii d ]

{Ii ,ci }i=1,...,N i

such that ∑i ci = ∑i ((1 − Ii )ei + Imi )
Notice that because of the utility cost of migrating, this problem is not equivalent to
simply (i) maximizing total resources and (ii) dividing them based on Pareto weights – it
is particularly costly to the social planner to send households with a large Pareto weight
to migrate. The optimal migration rule will be a function of the returns to migrating and
the Pareto weight.
Conditional on migration decisions, total resources are given by Y. The FOC imply
that each household receives a share αi (λi ) of total resources:
λi u0 (ci ) = λ j u0 (c j ), ∀i, j
λj
u 0 ( ci )
=
0
u (c j )
λi
 −γ
λj
ci
=
cj
λi
  −γ1
1
λj
ci = c j
= λ̃iγ c j
λi
And, then, imposing the budget constraint:
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∑ c i =Y
i

cj

1
γ

1 + ∑ λ̃i

!

=Y

i6= j

cj =

1
1
γ

Y

1 + ∑i6= j λ̃i
1

→ ci =

λ̃iγ

1
γ

Y

1 + ∑i6= j λ̃i
|
{z
}
αi

iγ
h
αi
).
(and, note, λ̃i = 1−
αi
Which households should migrate? Conditional on N − 1 migration decisions, the
total resources, assuming that total income from the other N − 1 households is ȳ, is:
Yno mig = yi + Ȳ
Ymig = mi + Ȳ
The return to the network of i migrating is proportional to the gain in income of migrating:

∑ λi
i



u(αi Ymig ) − u(αi Ynomig )



≈ ∑ λiαi u0 (αi Yno mig )∆Ymig-no mig
i

The cost to the network of i migrating is:

− λi d
So it is optimal for i to migrate, holding everything else constant, if:

∑ λiαi u0 (αi Yno mig )∆Ymig-no mig > λi d
i

Notice that if λi = 1∀i, this implies that αi = N1 , and we get that migration is optimal
if the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost:


d
0 Yno mig
u
∆Ymig-no mig >
N
N
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Notice that to compute this we need to know total resources of all other households.
Without any constraints, we should consider 2 N permutations of which agent migrates,
which is infeasible. Instead, we note that migration will depend on the return, ∆Ymig-no mig ,
and the cost which is proportional to λi . We want to find the correct order that people
would migrate so we can consider the net return of the next agent to migrate holding
all others constant, which only has dimension N, which is feasible. We can do this by
(i) guessing a migration order, based on return and Pareto weight, (ii) assuming this is
the correct order, compute total resources sequentially and then the net return to migrating, (iii) check the order we guessed is correct, (iv) if not, update the proposed order of
migration and compute again until we have the order correct.
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A.4.2

Value of subsidies: perfect risk sharing compared to autarky

This appendix derives some results regarding the welfare gain of a financial subsidy compared to a utility subsidy. We then use these results to develop intuition for when a migration subsidy will lead to a crowding-out of risk sharing and when it will lead to a
crowding-in. We consider two extremes: perfect risk sharing, where all income is equally
pooled and so consumption is equivalent to mean income, and autarky, where households consume their own income.
The key insight is that a financial subsidy acts as insurance and so it provides a larger
welfare gain if income is risky compared to if income is less risky. A utility subsidy
does not provide insurance. It thus provides a relatively lower benefit when income is
risky compared with when income is less risky. In comparison, if all income is equally
pooled, neither the welfare value of the financial subsidy nor the utility subsidy depend
on income.
Consider a migration income process, ym ∼ F (µm , σm ). Define implicitly three certainty equivalent values of migrating – no subsidy, financial subsidy, and utility subsidy,
respectively – by:
u(ce) = Eu( ym )
u(cefin ) = Eu( ym + dfin )
u(ceutility ) = Eu( ym ) + dutility
Define the change in utility as the new utility minus the no-subsidy utility:
∆cefin = cefin − ce
∆ceutility = ceutility − ce
Consider a mean-preserving change in the distribution arising from increasing the
standard deviation of the income distribution. If utility is concave, then the following
statements are true:

< 0 i.e., a riskier income stream has a lower certainty equivalent value.

1.

∂ce
∂σm

2.

∂∆cefin
∂σm

> 0 i.e., the increase in the certainty equivalent value of a financial transfer
increases in the riskiness of migration income. This is because a financial transfer is
more valuable when income is lower, which, for a mean-preserving spread, occurs
when the variance of income is larger.

3.

∂∆ceutility
∂σm

< 0 i.e., the increase in the certainty equivalent value of a utility subsidy
decreases in the riskiness of migration income. This is because a riskier income
process has a lower ce, and given utility curvature, a smaller consumption increase
is required to generate the same utility gain.
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Appendix Figure 2 gives a numerical example to illustrate the difference between a
financial and a utility shock. Panel (a) plots the utility of the migration gamble in gray,
where the standard deviation is given by the x-axis. As expected, the value of the gamble
is decreasing in income risk. The dashed line shows the value of the gamble when there is
a financial shock. Panel (b) plots the implied gain in consumption equivalent units. The
consumption equivalent gain is increasing in income risk. Panel (c) and (d) repeat the
exercise for a utility shock. In panel (c), the utility shock leads to a parallel shift in utility.
Panel (d) shows that the consumption-equivalent value of the utility shock decreases with
income risk.
Instead, if income was fully pooled, households consume expected income. Define the
(equivalent) expected income of migrating under three scenarios – no subsidy, financial
subsidy, and utility subsidy, respectively – by:
E y = Em ym
fin
Efin
y = Em ym + d
utility

u( E y

) = u( E y ) + dutility

Define the change in expected income as the new (equivalent) expected income minus
the no-subsidy expected income:
fin
fin
∆Efin
y = E y − E y (= d )
utility

∆E y

utility

= Ey

utility

− Ey

Both ∆Efin
are independent of income risk.
y and ∆E y
The solid magenta line in Appendix Figure 2 illustrates the change in equivalent expected income under perfect risk sharing for a financial shock (Panel (b)) and a utility
shock (Panel (d)) for the case of a normally-distributed income variable and log utility.
As expected, these quantities do not depend on income risk.
When households are independent, migration decisions are made based on the certainty equivalent value of migration. If households instead were fully pooling income
risk, migration decisions would be made based on expected income. A financial subsidy
will have a larger effect on the certainty equivalent value of migrating relative to the expected income when income is riskier. In this case, we may expect the incentive effect to
be tighter and hence risk sharing to reduce. On the other hand, a utility subsidy will have
a smaller effect on the certainty equivalent value of migrating when income is riskier.
This may lead to a looser incentive effect and an improvement in risk sharing.
Appendix Figure 3 shows the local derivatives around the point estimates when we
consider a mean-preserving change in the income variance, compared to the example. In
Figure 2 in the paper we considered a local change in the estimated variance. Because
income is log-normally distributed, this thus conflated both an increase in the mean and
an increase in the variance in income. In comparison, when we hold the mean effect
constant we see comparative statics that align exactly with the intuition above.
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Appendix Figure 2: Motivating figure: financial and utility shocks
(a) Level effects: financial subsidy
0.05

(b) Certainty equivalent gain (financial)
CEfin

Eu(y)
Eu(y+dfin )
u(Ey)

Eyfin

0.05

u(Ey+dfin )

0

0.04

Cons. equiv.

Utility

-0.05

-0.1

-0.15

0.03

0.02

-0.2

0.01
-0.25
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0

0.7

0

(c) Level effects: utility subsidy

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

(d) Certainty equivalent gain (utility)
Eu(y)

0.05

0.1

CEutility

0.075

Eu(y)+dutility
u(Ey)

Eyutility

utility

u(Ey)+d

0.07

0
0.065

Cons. equiv.

Utility

-0.05

-0.1

0.06

0.055

-0.15
0.05

-0.2
0.045

-0.25

0.04

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Note: Simulations assuming income is normally distributed with µ = 1 and σ given by the
value on the x axis and log utility. The financial shock is equal to 0.04. The utility shock is
equal to 0.05.
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0.7

Computational Result 3. The derivative of the change in risk sharing is increasing in the meanpreserving riskiness of migration income with a financial subsidy
Panel (b) of Appendix Figure 3 plots the effect of a financial subsidy to migrate. Panel
(bi) shows that the financial subsidy induces migration under autarky, but only for low
levels of income risk. Migration under limited commitment increases by 15%, independent of income risk. Panel (bii) shows that risk sharing improves overall (i.e., the estimated effect on beta is negative). The improvement in risk sharing is largest when income is least risky, although the magnitude is very small in all cases. Panel (biii) shows
that welfare increases slightly under autarky, and there is a very small decrease in estimated welfare (because the utility cost of migrating may not be fully compensated) under
limited commitment.
Computational Result 4. The derivative of the change in risk sharing is decreasing in the meanpreserving riskiness of migration income with a utility subsidy
Panel (c) of Appendix Figure 3 plots the effect of a utility subsidy to migrate. Panel
(ci) shows that the utility subsidy induces migration under autarky, with the largest effect
when income is least-risky. The migration effect under limited commitment is relatively
flat, although slightly higher when income is less risky. Panel (cii) shows that shows that
risk sharing improves overall (i.e., the estimated effect on beta is negative). In comparison
to the financial subsidy, the improvement in risk sharing is largest when income is the
most risky. Panel (ciii) shows that welfare increase is larger under limited commitment
than under autarky; the gap is larger the riskier income is.
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Appendix Figure 3: Comparative statics around income risk: utility and financial subsidies (rescaling mean)
(a) Control group

(b) Treatment effect: financial subsidy

(c) Treatment effect: utility subsidy

(d) Treatment effect: combined subsidy

Note: Migration income risk is measured relative to the baseline estimates (i.e., a value
of 1 is the baseline estimate). The log-normal distribution is rescaled so that the mean is
constant as the risk increases.
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A.5

Standard errors

To compute standard errors we numerically approximate the variance-covariance matrix.
Following the notation in Hansen (2016), the SMM estimator minimizes the weighted
deviations of the simulated moment conditions, ḡi (β), ∀i = 1, ..., l. The moment vector
has dimension (l × 1) and the parameter vector, β, has dimension (k × 1).
The SMM estimator minimizes:
β SMM = argminβ ḡ(β)0 W ḡ(β)
where W is a weight matrix of dimension l × l. The variance-covariance matrix is given
by:
−1

−1
Vβ = Q0 WQ
Q0 WΩWQ Q0 WQ
The matrix Q is a l × k gradient matrix of the derivatives of each simulated moment to
each parameter:
b = E ∂ ḡ(β)
Q
∂β0
We estimate Q by numerical differentiation, taking step sizes of 1% of the estimated value.
Because our problem is discrete, we smooth the objective function by a smoothing parameter λ = 1e−4 so that it is possible to compute the numerical derivatives. We approximate
Ω by the sample analog of the simulated moments:
b = E ḡ(β) ḡ(β)0
Ω
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B

Empirical appendix

This appendix provides additional details on empirical issues. We start by discussing
transfers and additional results from migrant surveys. We then include supplementary
tables and figures discussed in the text.

B.1

Magnitude of transfers in and transfers out

The summary statistics in Table 1 show that average transfers received by members in
the sample is larger than the total transfers given by the sample. The reason for this
difference is that only the poorest households in the village (based on land holdings and
on experiencing hunger the previous year) were eligible for the experiment. Data was
only collected on eligible households, not on the wealthier ineligible households. Thus, if
there were transfers between eligible and noneligible households we should expect giving
to be smaller than receipts in our sample.
We show in Appendix Table 1 that, as expected, households that are richer transfer
more than households that are poorer. The first four rows show mean income in column
1 and net giving (transfers given minus transfers received) as a percent of income in column 2, by income quartile in the data. Net transfers in as a fraction of income decreases
monotonically with income: the poorest income quartile has 64% of income coming from
net transfers in, while the richest income quartile has 19% of income coming from net
transfers in. We then construct linear predictions of these patterns in columns 3 and 4,
and extrapolate to the missing top 3/7ths of the income distribution in rows 5 through 7.
Once we do this exercise, we estimate that, at the village level, net giving would be 1723
Taka, suggesting that this linear approximation of transfers over the income distribution
can explain the transfer imbalance fairly well.
We note that any imbalance in the total amount of income to be shared amongst eligible households does not affect the Townsend regressions within the observed data, as the
village fixed effect is controlling for the total resources in the network. However, this is
potentially a concern for the structural estimation, as we impose that total income is equal
to total consumption when solving the model. Unfortunately, given the data we have, we
are not able to adjust for this in the structural estimation.
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Appendix Table 1: Extrapolated net giving
Data
Income group
Data: income quartile
1
2
3
4
Extrapolated/missing income groups
5
6
7
Overall net giving

Linear prediction

Mean income

Net giving
(% of income)

Mean income

Net giving
(% of income)

Net giving
(level)

4176
7349
10372
16111

-0.64
-0.35
-0.23
-0.19

3678
7560
11443
15326

-0.57
-0.43
-0.28
-0.13

-2103
-3216
-3191
-2029

19209
23091
26974

0.01
0.16
0.31

271
3708
8282
1723

Note: Our data (control villages) consists of the bottom 4/7ths of the income distribution of villages, and
thus the first four rows and first two columns show mean income and mean net giving (transfers given
minus received) as a percent of income. The third and fourth columns report a linear prediction of the first
two columns, and the fifth through seventh rows extrapolate to the rest of the village. The final column
multiplies the fifth and sixth columns to get net giving, and the final row sums this column.
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B.2

Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 2: Experimental design and data collection timeline

Round

Date

Obs

Data
Migration

Model period

Income

Consumption

Townsend test?
Robustness

Experiments
Main

Additional

Pre

X

X

1

July 2008
Planting

1900 HH
100 villages

X

12 months

Varies
(1 wk - 12 mo)

2

Nov 2008
Monga

1900 HH
100 villages

X

4 months

Varies
(1 wk - 4 mo)

X

Active

X

X

3

Nov 2009
Monga

1900 HH
100 villages

X

X

Varies
(1 wk - 12 mo)

X

X

X

X

4

July 2011
Planting

2527 HH
X
133 villages

12 months

Varies
X
(1 wk - 12 mo)

Post

X

X

5

Dec 2013
Monga

2527 HH
133 villages

12 months

Varies
(1 wk - 3 mo)

X

X

X

X

Robustness

Note: The row in bold (Round 4) is the data round primarily used in the analysis in the paper.
Experiments in Round 2 were: Cash, credit, info, control.
Experiments in Round 4 were: Rain insurance, price insurance, credit, conditional credit, job leads, control.
Experiments in Round 5 were: Credit, job leads, control.
Consumption recall periods varied by category: Food: 1 week, or 2 weeks if didn’t consume in past 1
week; fuel/transport expenses: 1 week; utility bills/rent/health expenses/personal items/entertainment:
1 month; clothing/furniture/events/education/durable purchases: 12 months in rounds 1, 3, and 4, 4
months in round 2, and 3 months in round 5.
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Appendix Table 3: Migration experiences (destination data)

Did you find a job at destination?
Do you think the income/wage is more than your area?
Did anyone from your travel group help in getting the job?
Did anyone else known to you help in getting the job?
Did anyone from your travel group or someone else help you in getting the job?
Did you migrate alone?
Did you expend other costs jointly with your group member?
Did you expend costs for food jointly with your group member?
Did you expend travel costs jointly with your group member?
Did you expend other costs jointly with your group member (specify)?
Are you currently sharing accommodations with a member of your travel group?
Did you only give job information to someone in your travel group?
Did you both give and receive job information from someone in your travel group?
Did you neither give nor receive job info from someone in your travel group?
How many times did you eat in the last week?
How many times did you have a full meal during the last week?
How many times did you have a meal with meat during the last week?
How many times did you have a meal with rice during the last week?
How much did you spend on food in total during the last week?
How much did you receive from your employer for food during the last week?
How much did you spend on accommodation during the last week?
How much did you spend on other expenditure during the last week?
How much did you receive as charity during the last week?
Did you only receive job information from someone in your travel group?
Statistics taken from the 2008 destination survey. Monetary values are in Taka.
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Mean Std. Div
0.979
0.143
0.890
0.314
0.338
0.475
0.234
0.425
0.545
0.500
0.228
0.421
0.330
0.472
0.703
0.463
0.811
0.397
0.622
0.492
0.705
0.458
0.152
0.360
0.464
0.501
0.277
0.449
20.510
1.768
17.959
3.603
7.972
4.278
19.138
3.499
16.943
26.170
101.437 37.048
0.901
2.630
8.453
8.035
0.116
0.921
0.107
0.311

Min
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
7.0
5.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Max Obvs.
1.0
145
1.0
145
1.0
145
1.0
145
1.0
145
1.0
145
1.0
112
1.0
37
1.0
37
1.0
37
1.0
112
1.0
112
1.0
112
1.0
112
21.0
145
21.0
145
21.0
145
21.0
145
95.7
145
262.9
145
15.0
145
69.3
145
10.0
145
1.0
112

Appendix Table 4: Migration experiences (endline data)

Variable
Did you migrate to a rural area?
When you migrated, did you migrate alone?
Did you migrate with the same person last year?
Did you work in the agricultural sector?
Did you work in the transportation sector?
Did you work as a non-ag. day laborer?
Did you work in a different sector?
Did you earn more than expected?
Did you earn less than expected?
Did you earn the same as expected?
How much did you earn in cash?
How much did you earn in non-monetary support?
How much money did you send back home?
What were the savings from migration?
N
Clusters

(1)
Not Incentivized
Mean/SE

(2)
Incentivized
Mean/SE

T-test
Difference
(1)-(2)

0.652
(0.031)
0.266
(0.040)
0.429
(0.054)
0.538
(0.034)
0.103
(0.034)
0.239
(0.038)
0.120
(0.024)
0.147
(0.028)
0.560
(0.035)
0.293
(0.033)
3448.995
(294.937)
845.163
(112.789)
976.902
(225.667)
1554.685
(116.222)
184
31

0.661
(0.027)
0.258
(0.023)
0.481
(0.027)
0.609
(0.030)
0.090
(0.014)
0.178
(0.023)
0.123
(0.018)
0.219
(0.024)
0.491
(0.028)
0.290
(0.023)
3370.511
(207.954)
1007.192
(87.802)
660.644
(83.199)
1883.278
(101.400)
489
68

-0.008

Notes: Taken from 2008 endline survey The value displayed for t-tests are the differences
in the means across the groups. Standard errors are clustered at variable village. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.
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0.009
-0.051
-0.071
0.013
0.061
-0.003
-0.072*
0.069
0.003
78.483
-162.029
316.258
-328.593**

Appendix Table 5: Treatment effect on transfers within the community, by migration status
All households

Willingness to help
Community member would help you
... and you would ask for help
Community member would ask you for help
... and you would help them
Actual transfers
Receive any transfer from community member
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Amount, if any transfer received (Tk)
Give any transfer to community member
Amount, if any transfer given (Tk)

Migrant households

Non-migrant households

Treatment
effect

Control
mean

Treatment
effect

Control
mean

Treatment
effect

Control
mean

0.030
(0.020)
0.025
(0.020)
0.109∗∗∗
(0.033)
0.109∗∗∗
(0.032)

0.85

0.045
(0.030)
0.034
(0.031)
0.140∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.129∗∗∗
(0.044)

0.85

0.032
(0.022)
0.031
(0.023)
0.091∗∗
(0.037)
0.094∗∗∗
(0.035)

0.85

-0.024
(0.022)
1821∗∗∗
(678)
0.036∗∗
(0.018)
1310
(558)

0.83
0.57
0.53
0.57
4808
0.15
2001

-0.003
(0.036)
648
(593)
0.049
(0.031)
816
(677)

0.83
0.59
0.55
0.55
4169
0.17
1984

-0.015
(0.028)
3175
(1108)
0.028
(0.020)
1937∗
(1024)

0.83
0.56
0.51
0.59
5185
0.14
2014

Note: The sample includes households from the 2011 survey. Columns 1 and 2 contain all households, columns 3 and 4 contain migrant households,
and columns 5 and 6 contain non-migrant households. Each cell is a separate regression of the effect of treatment on whether the source denoted in
the row would behave as described. Each regression also controls for upazila (county). Standard errors, clustered by village, are in parentheses, and
the mean of the control group is in the second column of each set. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Appendix Table 6: Effect of migration incentives on exposure of consumption to income,
cross-treatments
Log total consumption
Log income

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.157∗∗∗

0.156∗∗∗

0.158∗∗∗
(0.028)

(0.027)
-0.073∗∗∗
(0.027)

Log income x treatment
Treatment group restrictions
Log income x unassigned group

(0.027)

-0.085∗∗
(0.035)
-0.018
(0.033)
-0.106∗∗∗
(0.037)

Log income x self-formed group
Log income x assigned group
Treatment destination restrictions
Log income x unassigned destination

-0.020
(0.038)

-0.020
(0.039)

-0.065∗∗
(0.030)
-0.082∗∗
(0.032)
-0.021
(0.039)

1857
0.186

1857
0.188

1857
0.187

Log income x assigned destination
unconditional credit × logy
Observations
R-squared

Note: The sample includes households from the 2011 survey. The dependent variable is log annual percapita total consumption. The main independent variable is log annual per-capita income, interacted with
the respective treatment variable. All models control for village fixed effects and log income interacted with
2011 treatment arms. Standard errors, clustered by village, are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Appendix Table 7: Effect of migration incentives on exposure of consumption to income, alternative trims
Log total consumption
5% trim
Log income (round 4)
Treatment effect on log income
Log income (round 4)

2.5% trim

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.157∗∗∗
(0.027)
-0.073∗∗∗
(0.027)

0.112∗∗
(0.054)
-0.077
(0.061)

0.109∗∗
(0.046)
-0.099∗∗
(0.046)

Treatment effect on log income
Log income (round 4)

1% trim

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.137∗∗∗
(0.024)
-0.050∗∗
(0.023)

0.086∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.049
(0.040)

0.073∗∗
(0.028)
-0.049
(0.034)
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Treatment effect on log income
Village-round FE
Household FE
Includes baseline
Includes 2013
Observations
R squared

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.148∗∗∗
(0.027)
-0.081∗∗∗
(0.025)

0.106∗∗
(0.051)
-0.044
(0.065)

0.118∗∗
(0.051)
-0.073
(0.051)

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

1857
0.186

2166
0.791

4371
0.721

2251
0.193

3142
0.775

5635
0.696

2097
0.186

2366
0.782

4691
0.717

Note: Table presents coefficients of the effect of log annual per capita income on log annual per capita consumption and the interaction with treatment
(β0 and β1 from Equation 2). The sample in columns (1)-(3) uses income and consumption measures with a 5% trim (our main analysis sample), the
sample in columns (4)-(6) use a 2.5% trim, and columns (7)-(9) use a 1% trim. All models control for village fixed effects and all other interactions
between treatment and log income as well as log income interacted with 2011 treatments. For each trim set, the first column includes only 2011 data,
the second reports the results from a difference-in-difference specification with household fixed effects that includes baseline data and 2011 data,
and the third column reports the results from a difference-in-difference specification with household fixed effects that includes baseline data, 2011
data, and 2013 data. Standard errors, clustered by village, are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Appendix Table 8: Effect of migration incentives on exposure of consumption to income, alternative samples
Log total consumption
Main sample
Log income (round 4)
Treatment effect on log income
Village-round FE
Household FE
Includes baseline
Includes 2013
Observations
R squared

Controls in later experiment

Non-migrant households

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.157∗∗∗

0.112∗∗
(0.054)
-0.077
(0.061)

0.109∗∗

(0.046)
-0.099∗∗
(0.046)

0.193∗∗∗

(0.032)
-0.137∗∗∗
(0.046)

0.116
(0.071)
-0.116
(0.103)

0.105∗

0.167∗∗∗

0.128∗∗

0.193∗∗∗
(0.056)
-0.117∗∗
(0.052)

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

1857
0.186

2166
0.791

4371
0.721

497
0.171

786
0.771

1305
0.708

1140
0.224

1302
0.800

2734
0.760

(0.027)
-0.073∗∗∗
(0.027)

(0.053)
-0.073
(0.095)

(0.034)
-0.081∗∗
(0.033)

(0.057)
-0.098
(0.080)
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Note: Table presents coefficients of the effect of log annual per capita income on log annual per capita consumption and the interaction with treatment
(β0 and β1 from Equation 2). The sample in columns (1)-(3) is our main sample of households from the 2011 survey, the sample in columns (4)-(6)
includes households from the 2011 survey that were in control villages in the 2011 treatments, and the sample in columns (7)-(9) include non-migrant
households from the 2011 survey. All models control for village fixed effects, and columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) also control for log income interacted
with 2011 treatment arms. For each sample set, the first column includes only 2011 data, the second reports the results from a difference-in-difference
specification with household fixed effects that includes baseline data and 2011 data, and the third column reports the results from a difference-indifference specification with household fixed effects that includes baseline data, 2011 data, and 2013 data. Standard errors, clustered by village, are
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Appendix Table 9: Effect of migration incentives on exposure of consumption to income,
different household size assumptions
Log total consumption
Size:

Log income x treat, size: past 7 days
Log income x treat, size: current

past 7 days
(main spec.)
(1)
-0.073∗∗∗
(0.027)

current

past 14 days

equiv. scale

7 days + mig

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.046∗
(0.026)

Log income x treat, size: past 14 days
Log income x treat, size: equiv. scale

-0.077∗∗∗
(0.026)

Log income x treat, size: 7 days + migrants
Observations
R-squared

1857
0.186

1854
0.183

1860
0.191

-0.080∗∗∗
(0.026)

1854
0.221

-0.069∗∗
(0.027)
1858
0.184

Note: The sample includes households from the 2011 survey. The dependent variable is log of annual percapita total consumption. The main independent variable is log of annual per capita income, interacted
with treatment. The definition of household size used to calculate per capita terms is the total number
of household members present in at least the past 7 days at the time of the interview in column (1), the
total number of household members currently present at the time of the interview in column (2), the total
number of household members present in at least the past 14 days at the time of the interview in column
(3), an equivalence scale in column (4), and the total number of household members present in the past 7
days plus any migrants who have not yet returned in column (5). We use Townsend’s equivalence scale in
which the weights are: 1.0 for adult males, 0.9 for adult females, 0.94 for males 13-18, 0.83 for females 13-18,
0.67 for children 7-12, 0.52 for children 4-6, 0.32 for children 1-3, and 0.05 for infants. All models control for
log of income interacted with 2011 treatment arms and village fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by
village, are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix Table 10: Effect of migration incentives on exposure of consumption to income,
reverse regression
(1)
Log consumption (fwd)
Log income x control

(2)
Log income (rev)

0.204∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.131∗∗∗
(0.043)

Log income x treatment
Log consumption x control

0.567∗∗∗
(0.118)
0.385∗∗∗
(0.120)

Log consumption x treatment
Fwd/Rev ratio, control
Fwd/Rev ratio, treat
Observations
R-squared

1857
0.186

0.360
0.342
1857
0.166

Note: The sample includes households from the 2011 survey. In column (1) the dependent variable is log of
annual per-capita total consumption and the main independent variable is log of annual per-capita income,
interacted with the respective treatment variable. In column (2) the dependent and independent variables
are reversed. All models control for village fixed effects and the independent variable interacted with 2011
treatment arms. Standard errors, clustered by village, are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Appendix Table 11: Effect of migration incentives on exposure of consumption to income,
by income components
Log total consumption
(1)
-0.073∗∗∗
(0.027)

Log income x treatment
Log village income x treatment
Log migration income x treatment
Observations
R-squared

1857
0.186

(2)

(3)

-0.069∗∗∗
(0.024)

-0.048
(0.036)

1857
0.179

792
0.263

Note: The sample includes households from the 2011 survey. The dependent variable is log of annual percapita total consumption and the main independent variable is log of annual per-capita income, interacted
with the respective treatment variable. Income is defined as total income in column (1), village income in
column (2), and migration income (among migrants) in column (3). All models control for village fixed
effects and the independent variable interacted with 2011 treatment arms. Standard errors, clustered by
village, are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Appendix Table 12: Savings compared to income

Liquid assets
Mean liquid assets
Mean liquid assets saved recently*
Cash savings
Mean cash savings
Mean cash saved in past 12 months
Income
Mean village income
Mean migration income (migrants)
Mean total income
SD village income
SD migration income (migrants)
SD total income

Round 1

Round 2

Round 4

91
2

148
3

296
32

228

215

163
155

6185

3999
2760
4819
3085
2178
3455

8770
1959
9502
4721
1304
4728

3366

Note: Table reports data from control villages only. All numerical values are in per capita terms. *Liquid
assets saved recently corresponds to the last 4 months for round 2 and the last 12 months for rounds 1 and
4.
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Appendix Table 13: Robustness over dynamics and utility shock

Targeted moments
Risk sharing (control)
Risk sharing (treatment effect)
Mean migration rate
Mig. treatment effect (during RCT)
Mig. treatment effect (after RCT)
Migrate neither during/after RCT (control)
Migrate during and after RCT (control)
Migrate neither during/after RCT (treatment effect)
Migrate during and after RCT (treatment effect)
Mean log home income (migrant)
Std. log home income (migrant)
Mean log home income (nonmigrant)
Std. log home income (nonmigrant)
Log std. mig. income (migrant)
Log mean mig. income (nonmigrant prior pd.)
Log mean mig. income (migrant prior pd.)
Estimated parameters
CRRA parameter
Opportunity cost of migration
Utility cost of migrating
Utility subsidy
Decay rate of utility subsidy
Mean home income
Std. home income
Mean city income with contact
Std. city income with contact
Prob. get contact
Prob. lose contact if migrate
Prob. lose contact if don’t migrate
Discount factor
Model criterion
Model criterion

(1)
Data

(2)
Full model

(3)
No utility shock

(4)
No utility shock and no mig asset

0.16
-0.073
0.39
0.22
0.094
0.49
0.23
-0.17
0.15
1.80
0.67
2.13
0.56
0.27
0.60
0.73

0.16
-0.055
0.45
0.35
0.15
0.32
0.22
-0.16
0.14
1.57
0.29
2.63
0.33
0.23
0.39
0.51

-0.00054
0.000055
0.47
0.13
0.12
0.31
0.25
-0.15
0.11
1.15
0.46
2.72
0.49
0.28
0.57
0.62

-0.0016
0.00027
0.40
0.20
0.13
0.37
0.16
-0.14
0.12
0.87
0.44
2.80
0.59
0.28
0.80
0.80

1.88
0.15
0.075
0.075
0.15
2.23
0.58
0.38
0.78
0.79
0.44
0.66
0.70

1.80
0.19
0.13

1.73
0.25
0.088

2.08
0.88
0.37
0.85
0.93
0.32
0.74
0.70

2.15
1.02
0.61
0.71

1.72

2.91

3.01

Notes: Utility shock, if estimated, decays over 3 periods. Financial variables measured in annual log (thousands of Taka).
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Appendix Table 14: Robustness over discount factor and subsistence
(1)
Data
Risk sharing (control)
Risk sharing (treatment effect)
Mean migration rate
Mig. treatment effect (during RCT)
Mig. treatment effect (after RCT)
Migrate neither during/after RCT (control)
Migrate during and after RCT (control)
Migrate neither during/after RCT (treatment effect)
Migrate during and after RCT (treatment effect)
Mean log home income (migrant)
Std. log home income (migrant)
Mean log home income (nonmigrant)
Std. log home income (nonmigrant)
Log std. mig. income (migrant)
Log mean mig. income (nonmigrant prior pd.)
Log mean mig. income (migrant prior pd.)
Estimated parameters
CRRA parameter
Opportunity cost of migration
Utility cost of migrating
Utility subsidy
Decay rate of utility subsidy
Mean home income
Std. home income
Mean city income with contact
Std. city income with contact
Prob. get contact
Prob. lose contact if migrate
Prob. lose contact if don’t migrate
Discount factor
Model criterion
Model criterion

0.16
-0.073
0.39
0.22
0.094
0.49
0.23
-0.17
0.15
1.80
0.67
2.13
0.56
0.27
0.60
0.73

(2)
(3)
(4)
β = 0.7 β = 0.8 β = 0.9
0.16
-0.055
0.45
0.35
0.15
0.32
0.22
-0.16
0.14
1.57
0.29
2.63
0.33
0.23
0.39
0.51

0.082
-0.045
0.45
0.35
0.15
0.33
0.22
-0.15
0.13
1.61
0.30
2.67
0.33
0.25
0.39
0.51

-0.0054
0.00037
0.44
0.16
0.12
0.34
0.22
-0.14
0.11
1.34
0.51
3.06
0.61
0.27
0.64
0.68

1.88
0.15
0.075
0.075
0.15
2.23
0.58
0.38
0.78
0.79
0.44
0.66
0.70

1.94
0.14
0.072
0.076
0.13
2.26
0.58
0.37
0.80
0.78
0.44
0.66
0.80

1.75
0.16
0.11
0.058
0.41
2.38
1.01
0.48
0.78
0.94
0.42
0.68
0.90

1.72

2.09

2.80

Notes: The cost to consume a subsistence level of consumption, estimated to be 600 calories per day, is
estimated to be 250 Taka/month (3000 Taka annually). Because the model is measured in income, not
consumption, units, we set the subsistence level to 1000 Taka instead of 3000 Taka to match the proportion
of people below subsistence as measured by income with the proportion of people below subsistence as
measured by consumption.
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B.3

Appendix Figures

.00015

Appendix Figure 4: Distributions of baseline annual village income and consumption, by
treatment
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Difference in means: 158.6 (152.5)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value: 0.46

0

5000
10000
Baseline village income (Taka)
Treatment

.00015

Control

15000

0

.00005

Density

.0001

Difference in means: 54.8 (197.6)
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value: 0.96

5000

10000

15000
Baseline consumption (Taka)
Control

20000

25000

Treatment

Notes: Top figure is baseline annual village income and the bottom figure is baseline annual consumption,
in Taka. Black lines are treatment households and gray lines are control households. The dotted vertical
lines are the means of the distributions.
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Appendix Figure 5: Dynamics of migration subsidy: Robustness
(a) Mig asset X; utility sub. X

(b) Mig asset X; utility sub. X

(c) Mig asset X; utility sub. X

93

Appendix Figure 6: Decomposition of permanent shock
(a) Temporary: financial shock only

(b) Permanent: financial shock only

(c) Temporary: utility shock only

(d) Permanent: utility shock only

(e) Temporary: combined shock

(f) Permanent: combined shock
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